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THE THESIS

Statement of the Thesis

Underlying James Madison's political philosophy is a concern with the
power of special interest groups.' The fear that selfish interests might prevail
over the common good remains a contemporary concern.2 As in Madison's
day, majority rule, a republican form of government, and structural checks
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. B.A. Yale University,
1967; J.D., University of Texas, 1972. I thank my colleagues. Donald W. Dowd and
Ellen Wertheimer for their kind assistance. I am deeply indebted to my research assistants, Ingrid R. Pino, Esq., Georgette E. David, and Jeffrey B. Margulies.
1. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., R. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF A PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS.
CONTROL 40-53 (1982); G. WILL, STATECRAFT AS SOULCRAFr: WHAT GOVERNMENT
Dons 40-46 (1983).
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and balances are methods of restraining special interests. An additional way to
secure the public good is to ground society's members and leaders in civic
values so that they will act accordingly. Some societal institutions long have
educated the public in higher values and called for civic conduct in harmony
with those values. Schools, churches, and charitable organizations, for example, have consciously worked to further the public good.
In the United States, churches have an historic tradition of concern about
ethical standards in civic life. 3 In this Article, I argue that religious forces
generally have a positive effect on the American governmental process and
that this positive effect justifies an accommodationist judicial policy in matters
of church and state. I thus argue that religion makes a secular contribution to
society, that is, it contributes to meeting society's secular needs.
Religious forces, that is, religious institutions, groups, and individuals
with an explicitly religious background, 4 demand that virtue be an important
consideration in.political decisionmaking. "Virtue" is a force that encourages
decisionmakers to consider values on a high plane. In this context, virtue furthers the moral, altruistic, and similar concerns that are associated with religion.5 Religious forces may express these concerns in religious or secular
3. See infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
4. For this Article's purposes, "religion" refers to any system of belief to which
courts would find the Constitution's religion clauses applicable. The Supreme Court has
hesitated to attempt a precise definition of religion. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 215-16 (1972); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 318 n.4 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). Whether certain organizations
and beliefs are religious or secular can present close questions. E.g., Malnak v. Yogi,
592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (whether Transcendental Meditation is a religion). See
generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-11, at 859-65 (1978).
Where to draw the line between the religious and the nonreligious is not a focus of this
Article.
5. I choose the word "virtue" to make the association with the classical notion
of civic virtue. The classical virtues were wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance. See
C. COCHRANE, CHRISTIANITY AND CLASSICAL CULTURE

48-52 (1944). St. Augustine

believed that true virtue must have a religious foundation, but recognized civic virtue
as an authentic shadow of true virtue. See ST. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD, V. 18, in 6
WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 285-86 (G. Walsh & D. Zema trans.), 8 FATHERS OF
THE CHURCH SERIES (1950); ST. AUGUSTINE, To SIMPLICIAN--ON VARIOUS QUES-

TIONS, I q. 2:16, in AUGUSTINE: EARLIER WRITINGS 397-98 (J. Burleigh trans., 6 LIBRARY OF CHRISTIAN CLASSICS SERIES 1953); E. TESELLE, AUGUSTINE THE THEOLOGIAN 274 (1970). For him, the chief motivation for civic virtue is desire for glory, as

opposed to love of God, which is the basis of true virtue. He argued that Rome's era of
greatness was its reward for civic virtue:
After all, the pagans subordinated their private property to the common welfare, that is, to the republic and the public treasury. They resisted the temptation to avarice. They gave their counsel freely in the councils of the state.
They indulged in neither public crime nor private passion. They thought they
were on the right road when they strove, by all these means for honors, rule,
and glory. Honor has come to them from almost all peoples. . . . They have
no right to complain of the justice of the true and supreme God. They have
received their reward.
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terms. The expressly religious concerns may be tied closely to religious doctrine; for example, American Roman Catholic bishops may oppose nuclear
war, because it violates the church's just war doctrine.6 Concerns expressed in
secular terms also may have nonreligious sources and have the support of nonreligious people. For example, many religious and secular forces may oppose
nuclear war on humanitarian grounds. 7 Decisionmakers may choose to give
particular weight to the arguments of religious forces, because the arguments
are inherently compelling or because these interest groups have sufficient clout
to demand serious consideration.
Religious forces thus play a dual role in the political process. First, they
urge government leaders to consider virtuous concerns in decisionmaking. Second, they criticize government conduct that appears to be unvirtuous and thus
impose a "virtue check" on the political process." Because these roles are salutary, government should accommodate the needs of those making these contributions to the extent that accommodation falls short of violating the doctrine
of separation of church and state.9
City of God, supra, V, 15, at 277. See id., V, 14-21, at 274-92; Letter from St. Augustine to Marcellinus (Letter 138), in 11 WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 36, 42-53 (W.

Parsons trans., 20 FATHERS OF THE CHURCH SERIES 1953). The loss of civic virtue led
to Rome's decline. See City of God, supra, V, 19, at 287-88; Letter from St. Augustine
to Marcellinus, supra, at 48-49. As for the evils that befell Rome under Christian
emperors, he found fault not with the religious teaching, but with the emperors or
"those other men without whom emperors cannot get anything done." Id. at 48. See
City of God, supra, V, 24-26, at 296-302.
St. Augustine thus furnishes a precedent for a religious recognition that a successful society depends on the secular virtues of its citizens. He probably would agree with
this Article's thesis that those with religious values contribute to the growth of secular
virtue, as well as religious virtue. See E. TESELLE, supra, at 277-78.
Americans in the Revolutionary and Federalist eras were well acquainted with the
classical notion of civic virtue. For them, civic virtue meant pursuing the common good
as opposed to one's selfish interests. See J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT
506-36 (1975); G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 185-92 (1981); in-

fra note 58.
6. See National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace:
God's Promise and Our Response, reprintedin Nat'l. Cath. Rep., June 17, 1983, at 5,
col. 1; Bishops' Letter on Nuclear Arms is Revised to More Flexible View, New York
Times, April 6, 1983, at Al, col. 5. By a 238 to 9 vote, the bishops called for a halt to
nuclear weapons propagation, gave nuclear deterrence a strictly conditioned acceptance
as disarmament is pursued, and asserted that first use of nuclear weapons cannot be
morally justified in any foreseeable situation.
7. See, e.g., National Conference of Catholic Bishops, supra note 6, at B1, col.
1 (acknowledging the obligation "to create a community of conscience in the wider civil
community").
8. The notion of a virtue check is analogous to the notion that the first amendment's free speech and free press clauses help check the abuse of power by public
officials. See Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. BAR
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521; infra note 24 and accompanying text.
9. The first amendment's religion clauses state "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ..
U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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The argument presented here accepts separation of church and state as a
wise and constitutionally mandated principle. It recognizes, however, that
complete separation is not possible or desirable. In any number of situations,
the Supreme Court has permitted accommodations that lawmakers have found
acceptable.10 For example, the Court has upheld certain types of direct or indirect financial aid to students at church-related schools and colleges"" and
certain exemptions from government mandates for individuals who object to
the mandates as a matter of religious conviction.' 2 As the great number of
split decisions and plurality opinions demonstrates, cases often present very
close questions whether a particular law violates the doctrine of separation of
church and state.'3
This Article's analysis offers an additional policy consideration to help tip
the closely balanced scales. In close cases in which traditional constitutional
analysis fails to furnish a broad judicial consensus, the side favoring accommodation should succeed when accommodation will strengthen the religious
forces that contribute to virtuous decisionmaking and check abuses in the political process.
In this Article, I first develop the thesis and evaluate objections to it. I
also relate it to the thinking of the Constitution's Framers. Modern Supreme
10. The Supreme Court has never adopted a strict separationist position. See L.
supra note 4, § 14-4, at 819 (1978). Chief Justice Burger has described the wall
between church and state as "a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on
all the circumstances of a particular relationship." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
614 (1971). The metaphor of the wall of separation originated with Thomas Jefferson.
See Letter of Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Assn. (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted
in 16 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1903).
11. E.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Relig. Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426
U.S. 736 (1976). See generally infra Part III of this Article.
12. E.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (statute cannot condition
unemployment compensation on conduct prohibited by religious belief); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state cannot require Amish parents to send children to
school after eighth grade, contrary to religious conviction); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) (state cannot deny unemployment compensation to Sabbatarian for
refusing to work on Saturday).
13. The split decisions in the school aid cases illustrate the point. E.g., Aguilar
v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985) (6-3 decision); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball,
105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985) (invalidating one type of aid by a 5-4 vote and another type by
a 7-2 vote); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (5-4 decision); Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (5-4 decision); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977) (upholding four and invalidating two types of aid; the votes were 8-1, 7-2, 6-3,
6-3, 6-3, and 5-4); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (upholding one and invalidating two types of aid; the votes were all 6-3, with different majorities); Wheeler v.
Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974) (8-1 decision); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973) (6-3 decision); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (6-3 decision); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (8-1 decision); Lemon
v. Kurtzman (Lemon II), 413 U.S. 192 (1973) (5-3 decision); Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672 (1971) (5-3 decision); Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon I), 403 U.S. 602
(1971) (8-0 and 8-1 decisions).
TRIBE,
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Court cases on church and state then are reviewed in search of acknowledgment of the positive dimensions of church-state relations. I conclude by applying the thesis to cases dealing with government aid to church-related schools
and their students.
B. The Religious Contribution to the PoliticalSystem
My argument presents a helpful approach for those who favor greater
interaction of religious values with legal and political values. 14 These advocates
face the objection that greater interaction requires imposing particular religious beliefs on society. The alternative, they are told, lacks efficacy: in order
to avoid impinging on religious freedom in a diverse society, the religious contribution would consist of vague, inoffensive generalizations. 15 My analysis offers another viewpoint. It recognizes that religious forces champion religious
values by being effective interest groups in the political system. The competition of other interest groups and the constitutional doctrine of antiestablishmentarianism prevent one sect from gaining coercive religious power over
nonbelievers. Religious forces, moreover, do more than promote the invocation
of vague generalizations; they seek to influence concrete political decisions. My
analysis favors fostering this interaction of religion and society by fostering the
vitality of religious forces, that is by reading the Constitution's religion clauses
from an accommodationist perspective.'"
Traditional judicial analysis of the religion clauses barely acknowledges
the notion that religion has a positive effect on society and government.1 7 Discussions of the free exercise clause identify the believer's freedom of conscience as the clause's justification.' 8 Cases concerning free speech and free
press also emphasize the protection of individual integrity, but they further
recognize the contribution of free expression to an informed, open political
process.' 9 When the Court focuses on free exercise, it usually fails to note that
religious expression offers benefits to others in addition to the beleaguered be14. The modern seminal work on the subject is H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION
(1974).
15. For a summary of this debate, see Symposium: The Secularization of the
Law, 31 MERCER L. REV. 401 (1980) (major contributions by Harold Berman, Edward
M. Gaffney, Lois Forer, Charles Donahue, Jr.).
16. My analysis speaks only to one part of the discussion on the interaction of
law and religion. The full discussion focuses primarily on broad concerns, including law
and religion as dimensions of culture that share the elements of ritual, tradition, and
authority; the influence of religion on basic legal concepts and institutions; religion's
concern for social order and social justice; and the consequences of radical separation
of religious values and legal and political values. The advisability of separating reliOF LAW AND RELIGION

gious institutions from legal and political institutions is an unchallenged presupposition
to the discussion. See H. BERMAN, supra note 14; Symposium, supra note 15.
17. See infra Part II of this Article.
18. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
19. See infra notes 137-48 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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liever, for example, the leafletting Jehovah's Witness 2° or the Sabbatarian who
risks unemployment benefits by refusing to work on Saturdays. 21 As a result,
these forms of religious exercise are inconveniences to be tolerated in order to
preserve the guaranty of autonomy, which in turn, protects more traditional
22
styles of religious exercise.
As for the establishment clause, the traditional analysis focuses on the
negative aspects of church-state interrelationships. Judicial emphasis on the
word "entanglement" reflects the fear of government interference with church
autonomy and the threat of political divisiveness along religious lines. 23 Traditional constitutional analysis thus fails to recognize the positive dimension to
church-state relationships.
Despite the neglect of religion's beneficial role in the political process, the
religion clauses permit a contribution analogous to the contribution that the
free speech and press clauses permit.' 4 Like the religion clauses, the speech
and press clauses protect individual autonomy against the state by permitting
citizens to form and communicate their beliefs. Free expression also promotes
diversity of opinion. Our system assumes that the marketplace of ideas is the
forum in which to determine truth and enhance understanding of the government process and the subject matter with which it deals. Free speech and free
press also furnish a dual check on the political process. First, the freedom to
scrutinize and expose places a check on the misconduct of public officials. Second, the clauses also offer a general safeguard against misfunction in the political process by promoting the informed participation of a vigilant citizenry.
Free speech and free press thus check abuses and promote political participation in our self-governing society.
Because the religion clauses guarantee free exercise and prohibit preferential treatment, they, too, emphasize individual and group autonomy' 5 and
toleration of diversity. 28 They thus encourage formation and communication of
20. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1943).
21. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).

22. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642

(1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).

23. See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
24. This analysis of the free expression clause's contribution to the political pro-

cess draws upon A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE (1965); and Blasi, supra note 8. Meiklejohn developed the theory that
the first amendment protects free expression, because it is part of a process of selfgovernment that assumes a high degree of democratic participation. Blasi argues that
free expression also checks the misconduct of public officials; he recognizes the role of
countervailing powers and views the press as the primary institution to exercise the
check. For a general discussion of rationales for giving special protection to free expression, see Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1110-26 (1979).
25. See Laycock, Toward a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1373 (1981).
26. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/3
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belief and presume the merit of a marketplace of ideas. To the extent that
religious belief and expression speak to political concerns, the religion clauses
imply a particular value to views bottomed on religious conviction. According
to my argument, religiously based views deserve attention, because they stem
from moral, altruistic, and other similar values. They therefore make a special
27
contribution to the political process.
Religion makes both a general and concrete contribution to the political
process. It makes a general contribution by adding to the process a general
concern for higher principles. It makes a concrete contribution when religious
forces take positions on specific issues. The latter contribution may come in
any of three ways.
First, a significant religious bloc may form a broad consensus on a particular issue, such as world hunger or nuclear disarmament.2" Whatever the merits of the bloc's position, its efforts add a virtuous orientation to the political
debate.2 9 By affecting the orientation, it may reduce the persuasiveness of
those with ignoble arguments.
Second, certain religious interests may press for a specific piece of legislation or other government action, perhaps on an issue like world hunger, or
perhaps on a highly controversial issue like abortion, school prayer, sex education, or the teaching of evolution. Other religious and nonreligious interests
may take contrary positions. Just like advocates of any other interest, religious
advocates must work for their goal. Their special contribution lies in directing
attention to an issue that might otherwise lack prominence and in compelling
at least some of the debate to take place on a higher plane. 30 For example,
they may remind decisionmakers that a routine determination on agricultural
policy may affect the availability of food in the world. The contributions may
not always arise;3 ' motivations may be venal or the debate simply may degenerate into unreflective sloganeering. The assumption is that religious participation generally will result in a positive contribution to the political process.
Third, religious groups or individuals with ties to a religious tradition may
serve as prophetic voices.3 2 They may find themselves in extreme disagreement
27. Other commentators have touched on this argument. See Marty, Epilogue:
The Natures and Consequences of Social Conflict for Religious Groups, in RELIGION
AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 174 (R. Lee & M. Marty ed. 1964); Van Patten, In the End is
the Beginning: An Inquiry into the Meaning of the Religion Clauses, 27 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 1, 81-83 (1983); Weber, Building on Sand: Supreme Court Construction and
Educational Tax Credits, 12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 531, 550-55 (1978).
28. See, e.g., supra note 6.
29. For an illustration of the call for religious involvement in the political process during the Johnson administration, see W. STRINGFELLOW, DISSENTER IN A GREAT
SOCIETY (1966).
30. See G. WINTER, ELEMENTS FOR A SOCIAL ETHIC 277-78 (1966) (a poli-

cymaker may have to make practical compromises, but still needs to make decisions
informed by ethical criticism).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 39-49.
32. I use "prophetic" in the Biblical sense. A prophet is "one who challenges
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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with societal decisions and oppose them with words, actions, and even civil
disobedience. Contemporary examples would include peace activists who engage in civil disobedience, 33 churches in the pre-civil rights South, 34 and
groups like the Catholic Worker 35 and Sojourners.36 Their participation may
be dramatic, but their effectiveness is not always predictable. Prophets are not
necessarily heeded in their own times.3 7 Most often, their extreme positions
fail to win out, but they influence the public debate and final decision. 38
Religious forces, then, can achieve a desirable secular effect on the political process.
C.

Objections to the Thesis

Three major objections challenge my argument that beneficial secular
contributions of religion justify a liberal accommodationist policy. First, it
may be said, an advocate's religious affiliation offers no guarantee of virtue.
the current social order, and in particular the state and its instrumentalities, in the
name of higher truth." McLennan, Response to Lois Forer, 31 MERCER L. REV. 456
(1980).
33. See, e.g., D. Berrigan, Trial of the Catonsville Nine, reprintedin THE BEST
PLAYS OF 1970-71 (0. Guernsey ed. 1971); Turner, Tax Refusal Completes Prelate's
Moral Journey, N.Y. Times, April 19, 1982, at A16, col. 2.
34. See, e.g., McCoy, The Churches and ProtestMovements for Racial Justice,
in RELIGION AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 37, 43-50 (R. Lee & M. Marty ed. 1964); R.
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 13-31, 571-607, 953-54, 956 (1975); J. WALLIS, BROTHER TO
A DRAGONFLY

107-250 (1979).

35. Founded by Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin, the Catholic Worker Movement is the mother of the American Catholic left. With a uniquely anarchist-pacifist
perspective, its members run houses of hospitality for the poor, publish a newspaper,
Catholic Worker, participate in social causes, and frequently employ civil disobedience.
See, e.g., D. DAY, THE LONG LONELINESS (1981); W. MILLER, DOROTHY DAY (1981);
M.

PIEHL, BREAKING BREAD: THE CATHOLIC WORKER AND THE ORIGIN OF CATHOLIC
RADICALISM IN AMERICA (1982); Wills, The Dragooned Saint, SOJOURNERS, Septem-

ber 1982, at 35; Whitman, Dorothy Day, Catholic Activist, 83, Dies, N.Y. Times,
November 30, 1980, § 1 at 45.
36. Sojourners is a small community in inner-city Washington, D.C. It is the
evangelical Christian counterpart to the Catholic Worker (see supra note 35) and has
broad ecumenical appeal. In addition to working with the poor and participating in
social causes, it publishes the magazine SOJOURNERS.
37. See Luke 4:24.
38. For example, the Catholic Worker has strongly influenced clergy and laity
who themselves have played a prophetic role or a more mainstream role in society.
Their numbers include intellectuals John Cogley and Michael Harrington, Trappist author Thomas Merton, peace activists Daniel and Philip Berrigan, educator Ivan Illich,
and union organizer Cesar Chavez. See Whitman, supra note 35.
SOJOURNERS magazine's list of contributing editors includes Sen. Mark Hatfield
as well as others well known in religious and social justice circles.
Church based leaders of the civil rights movement served partly as prophets and
partly as more conventional advocates. For an account of their lobbying efforts during
the Kennedy administration, see A. SCHLESINGER, JR., A THOUSAND DAYS 924-77
(1965).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/3
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Second, contributions to political virtue may come from nonreligious sources
to which my argument for religious accommodation gives no assistance. Third,
religious accommodation, like support of religion, impairs religious autonomy,
corrupts religious virtue, and thus weakens or precludes any contribution to
the political system. These objections are not entirely without merit. Nonetheless, persuasive responses are available.
As for the first objection, all assertions issuing from a religious institution
or individual obviously do not emanate from a higher source. Some religious
positions may derive from venal motives, such as self-aggrandizement of a
church or minister. Sincere religious advocates may disagree on which position
is, in fact, virtuous. My argument is that, in spite of these difficulties, religion
in the United States adds a moral, virtuous dimension to a political debate
dominated by special interests. This argument does not lend itself to empirical
proof. Nonetheless, one easily could find support for the proposition in American history. Religious leaders have played major roles in many significant
movements, 39 including the abolition of slavery, 40 civil rights,"" prison reform,42 public education, 4 3 labor organizing, 44 social welfare,'45 and peace
39. For example, evangelical Christians rooted in the Great Awakening provided a rationale and stimulus for the American Revolution. They believed they could
forward the progress of history and thus give momentum to the coming of the millenium by helping develop a Christian commonwealth. See A. HEIMERT, RELIGION AND
THE AMERICAN MIND: FROM THE GREAT AWAKENING TO THE REVOLUTION (1966).
40. See S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 648-

69 (1972). Churches originally did not join in the antislavery cause but by the midnineteenth century, their moral concern over the issue motivated them to take the lead
in the movement. See id. at 657. As opposition to slavery solidified in the North, southern churches began to mute their opposition in conformity with the romantic ideal of
the "new Southern nationalism." See id. at 653-55; see also Davis, The Emergence of
Immediatism in British and American Antislavery Thought, in RELIGION IN AMERICAN HISTORY: INTERPRETIVE ESSAYS 236 (J. Mulder & J. Wilson ed. 1978).
41. See S. AHLSTROM, supra note 40, at 1072-78; R. HANDY, A HISTORY OF
CHURCHES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 414-15 (1977). For an account of
participation by religious leadership in the efforts to enact the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
see J. ADAMS, THE GROWING CHURCH LOBBY IN WASHINGTON 1-43 (1970).
42. In the post-Revolutionary era, Quakers in Philadelphia joined with members of other religions and formed the Philadelphia Society for Assisting Distressed
Persons. See J. MOYHAHAN & E. STEWART, THE AMERICAN JAIL: ITS DEVELOPMENT
AND GROWTH 34-35 (1980). During the mid-nineteenth century, religious influences
dominated the prison reform movement under the leadership of the Rev. Louis Dwight

and the Boston Disciplinary Society. See S. AHLSTROM, supra note 40, at 644; B. McKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS: A STUDY IN AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY PRIOR TO 1915
38-39 (1936); see also R. HANDY, supra note 41, at 183.
43.

From the early nineteenth century, Protestant leaders such as Horace Mann

and William Ellery Channing worked for comprehensive public school systems. Their
notion of public education included the inculcation of "common Christianity," a nonsectarian "National Protestantism." See E. NORMAN, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE STATE
138-40 (1968).
44. Roman Catholics were a strong force in the movement toward unionism,
since Catholics were the largest discrete element among America's distressed workers.
IN NORTH AMERICA
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movements.4
Critics may disagree whether the contributions were for good or ill and
47
may note that religious leaders have endorsed both sides of any major issue.
A partial reply is possible. On some prominent issues, religious forces have
formed a consensus on one side, though certainly some religious support has
arisen on the opposite side. The civil rights movement offers an example.4 8
Many Americans might agree that the side with the consensus of religious
support usually was the better side, though they might disagree with specific
proposals issued by that side. Others might disagree that religious forces chose
the better side.4 They, however, might agree that the religious presence on an
issue has contributed a valuable dimension to the discussion, whether it ultimately has favored one side or both sides of the issue. In any case, the assumption is that most Americans would agree that religion is a force for
virtue.
The second objection to my argument would emphasize the contributions
to political virtue that come from nonreligious institutions and individuals.
Critics might ask why those entities and individuals should rpot receive the
same accommodation as their religious counterparts. The short response would
cite the text of the first amendment and note the express recognition it gives to
religious expression. The more elaborate response might look to the sparse history we have concerning the amendment's drafting. Prior versions of the
amendment also banned infringement on "rights of conscience. '5 The historiSee S. AHLSTROM, supra note 40, at 1003; Abell, The Catholic Factor in the Social
Justice Movement, in ROMAN CATHOLICISM AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE 70-98

(T. McAvoy ed. 1960).
45. See Pickrell & Horwich, "Religionas an Engine of Social Policy". A Comment on the First Amendment Limitations on the Church-State Partnership in the
Social Welfare Field, 44 LAW

AND

CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 112-15 (1981); Van Patten,

supra note 27, at 83 & nn.364-65.
46. For a brief history of war resistance in the United States, see DiSalvo, Saying "No" to War in the Technological Age-Conscientious Objection and the World
Peace Tax Fund Act, 31 DEPAUL L. REV. 497, 498-507 (1982). For an account of
religious peace activism in the 1960's, see J. ADAMS, supra note 41, at 204-30. On
current efforts, see supra note 6; J. CASTELLI, THE BISHOPS AND THE BOMB (1984).
47. Examples of issues on which I feel that most authorities in my particular
religion (Roman Catholic) largely have taken the wrong side include opposition to child
labor laws in the 1920's; see Abell, supra note 44, at 79; opposition to gay rights; see
Nugent, Homosexuality and the Vatican, Christian Century, May 9, 1984, at 487;
resistance to feminism; see Kalven, Women's Voices Began to Challenge ... After
Negative Vatican Council Events, Nat'l Cath. Rep., April 13, 1984, at 10, Col. 1; and
an affection for single issue politics; see, e.g., Ryan, Theology a la Cuomo, O'Connor,
Nat'l Cath. Rep., Aug. 17, 1984, at 8, col. 1.
48. As recently as 1983, the Supreme Court had to deal with litigation precipi-

tated by a fundamentalist Christian university's racial discrimination, which was based

on religious conviction. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,'461 U.S. 574 (1983).
49. See, e.g., supra note 47.
50. "Congress shall make no law establishing religion or to prevent the free
exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience." THE FIRST CONGRESS, MARCH
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/3
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cal record furnishes no reason why the first Congress rejected the phrase. One
interpretation might find a conscious decision to give special protection to only
religiously based rights. A reading of the limited recorded debate suggests that
the drafters were concerned only with religious freedom and equated conscience with religious conscience, at least for purposes of the amendment.5
Their rationale may have resulted from a special respect for religion, perhaps
because of its express link with the transcendent. It also may have resulted
from a special concern for religious freedom, based on the recent experience of
some colonies with the established church of England and of some New Englanders with established Congregational churches. 52 It also may have resulted
from fear that protection for all forms of sincere expression would unleash an
Congressional action had infringed on
unmanageable flood of claims that some
53
conscience.
of
right
individual's
some
Whatever the reason, my argument does not disparage the rights or contributions of the nonreligious conscience. Perhaps those rights must seek protection from the free speech and free press clauses and from sensitive govern4, 1789-MARCH 3, 1791 431 (R. Williams ed. 1970).

51. See id. at 373-77.
52. In the pre-Revolutionary era, religious establishments in the American colonies were tolerant. Prior to the 1760's, controversies over establishment were only episodic. In the 1760's and 1770's, two major episodes triggered a general concern with
establishment and related antiestablishment mood with Revolutionary thought.
In 1759, the Virginia Assembly devalued the salaries of the Anglican clergy and
launched a heated controversy with the Bishop of London as well as the local clergy of
the established Anglican church. The king in council disallowed the act and thus joined
government oppression with ecclesiastical oppression in the minds of the colonists.
In 1759, in Massachusetts, the Anglican church founded a branch of its missionary society under the contentious leadership of East Apthorp. Massachusetts colonists
enjoyed a tolerant type of Congregationalist establishment and interpreted the move as
the beginning of an effort to establish in America an Anglican episcopate hostile to
New England nonconformism. The Americans recognized that Parliament would be
the vehicle for Anglican establishment efforts. At the same time, Americans were beginning to challenge Parliament's authority over the colonies in other matters.
During the same era, radical dissenters began attacks against churches established
in the colonies. In Massachusetts, for example, dissenters objected to paying taxes to
support the Congregational church and argued that the taxes were as illegitimate as
those that Parliament was imposing on the colonies. The struggle for religious liberty
thus merged with the struggle for civil liberty. See B.

BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL

ORI-

247-72 (1967).
53. Speculative theory might tie the disappearance of the word "conscience"
from the first amendment to eighteenth century deism. Deism proclaimed natural religion, rationality, and the rejection of divine revelation. See G. KOCH, REPUBLICAN RELIGION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE CULT OF REASON (1933). Anti-deists
may have feared that including "conscience" in the first amendment's text would connote acceptance of deism's repudiation of external authority in moral and ethical matters. In addition, most deists belonged to the upper classes and many feared the spread
of militant deism to members of other social strata. They viewed it as potentially dangerous enough to destroy not only organized religion, but also the social order. See H.
GINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

MORAIs, DEISM IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AMERICA

14-15 (1960). Deists thus also

may have favored the change in the proposed amendment's language.
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ment bodies. Courts, moreover, have been generous in treating arguably
secular claims of conscience as religious claims. 5 ' In any case, an analysis that
recognizes the religious contribution to the political process and argues for
liberal religious accommodation is discrete from a consideration of the nonreligious conscience.
The third objection might recognize the positive influence of religion, but
argue that religion's strength derives from its autonomy. Because accommodation violates that autonomy, it risks corrupting religious virtue55 and emasculating its contribution to the political process. In the abstract, the argument
has obvious merit; however, it has less merit given the reality of American
society.
Our Constitution and traditions accept as a major premise the separation
of church and state.5 6 Without this premise, unlimited state involvement in
religious enterprises easily could corrupt them. But the liberal accommodation
that I advocate is really a limited accommodation in a society that subscribes
to separation. This accommodation runs little risk of corrupting religious
forces. My specific argument, moreover, focuses on accommodation only in
those cases in which reasonable people disagree whether the accommodation
runs afoul of the American brand of separation. Unlimited state involvement
is not at issue here.
In any case, our law and traditions accept accommodation as permissible
and salutary; 57 the question is one of degree. The objection that warns of religious corruption has some validity, but it poses no serious obstacle to my
argument.
The nature of the above objections points to the underlying issue. My
argument rests on assumptions about religion's positive contribution to society
and about acceptable types of church-state interplay. Though these assumptions are not entirely capable of empirical proof, my arguments suggest that
my thesis is in harmony with the mainstream of American thought.
D. The Thesis in Historical Context
The Constitution's Framers recognized that civic virtue and morality are
essential to a desirable society and government. 8 They also recognized that
54. See L. TRIBE, supra note 4, § 14-6, at 826-33, § 14-11, at 859-65.

55. The fear that state assistance to churches would corrupt them is in the tradition of Roger Williams. It was a strongly influential notion at the time of the Constitution's framing. See M. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 5-31 (1965).
56. See generally Part I.D. of this Article.
57. See generally Part II.A. of this Article.
58. Virtue in the classical humanist tradition, played a major role in the thinking of American Revolutionaries. They viewed English government and society as a
source of corruption that threatened their virtue. See B. BAILYN, supra note 52, at 79143; J. POCOCK, supra note 5, at 507-13; G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC: 1776-1787 32-36 (1969). By the time of the Constitution's framing, however, the Federalists felt that their experience under the Articles of Confederation had
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/3
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religion contributes to advancing these qualities.0 9 Some Framers, however,
might have disagreed whether organized religion makes a contribution and
whether any such contribution outweighs the sectarian divisiveness it foments. 60 As in the traditional debate over the degree of separation that the
Framers envisioned, the evidence lies in their statements and in the practices
of the time, all in light of the prevailing social, political, and economic conditions of the era.61
Certain practices disclose a recognition of the religious contribution. For
example, the Continental Congress always opened with a prayer; 62 the armed
forces and all congresses retained chaplains; 3 a religious service was part of
George Washington's inauguration ceremony;" with the exception of Jefferson, all presidents followed the Continental Congress's example in declaring
days of thanksgiving and prayer; 5 numerous states continued to have an esproven the failure of classical political theory in this country. They argued that a natural, virtuous aristocracy had not arisen and that the states had generated undisciplined,
parochial legislatures instead of enlightened republics. See J. POCOCK, supra, at 51621; G. WOOD, supra, at 391-425. In advocating the Constitution, the Federalists
pressed for a new form of government that relied heavily on separation of powers,
checks and balances, and an innovative federalism presiding over a geographically extensive republic. They relied on these innovations to secure the public good. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 10 & 51 129-36, 355-59 (J. Madison ) (B. Wright ed. 1961); Morris,
Book Review, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 406 (1982); infra notes 108-11 and accompanying
text. Among historians, controversy exists over the extent that the Federalists viewed
virtuous leaders as a necessary element in the working of the proposed political system.
See, e.g., Shklar, Book Review, 90 YALE L.J. 942, 948-50 (1981) (critically reviewing
G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST (1981)). Even if the Framers had
abandoned classical political theory, however, virtue continued to be a part of their
language and thought. See J. POCOCK, supra, at 524-45; Myers, Book Review, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 1, 1981, § 7 (Book Reviews), at 11, 25. Madison and others hoped that
the proposed system would raise virtuous people to leadership positions. See, e.g., FEDERALIST

No. 10, supra, at 134; G.

WOOD,

supra, at 505.

59. See, e.g., EditorialNote on Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious
Assessments, in 8 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295 (R. Rutland & W. Rachal ed.
1973); A. HEIMERT, supra note 39, at 519-21, 528-32, 545-48 (1966); G. WOOD, supra
note 58, at 427-28 (1969); Whitson, American Pluralism,THOUGHT 525, 526 (Winter
1962).
60. See infra notes 90-92 & 98 and accompanying text.
61. The purpose of an historical search is to inform constitutional interpretation
with an appreciation of the purposes and values underlying the amendment's language.
Changes in assumptions about government and society make ascertainment of the precise intent elusive and not of great relevance. See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part L The Religious Liberty Guarantee,80
HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1383-84 (1967); Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 31 U. Cm. L. REV. 502 (1964).
62. L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 120 (rev. ed. 1967).
63. Id.
64. A.

STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES

87

(1964).
65. L. PFEFFER, supra note 62, at 266. President Andrew Jackson later followed
Jefferson's example and refused to issue thanksgiving proclamations. Id. For an ac-
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tablished church well into the nineteenth century.66 Members of the constitutional generation often articulated the importance of religion in public life. For
example, the Declaration of Independence includes numerous references to
God; 67 the Northwest Ordinance expressly recognizes that religion and moral-

ity, along with knowledge, are necessary to good government; 68 the Continental Congress 69 and leaders in state government" frequently made reference to
their commitment to advancing religion.
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson perhaps represent the extreme position favoring separation of church and state. Their prominent writings recognize the positive contributions of religion-but not organized religion-to government. 71 Their words and actions, however, have long furnished ammunition
count of the desire of the First Congress for a presidential Thanksgiving Day proclamation, see Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2513-14 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
66. See generally S. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 51017 (1902). In 1833, Massachusetts became the last state to disestablish its state
church. Id. at 515.
67. In the Declaration of Independence, the Continental Congress stated that it
sometimes becomes necessary for a people to become the independent political entity to
which the "laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them," that the Creator endows
all people with certain unalienable rights, and that the declarants appeal to the "Supreme Judge of the world" for the rectitude of their intentions.
68. Northwest Ordinance (U.S. 1787).
69. See L. PFEFFER, supra note 62, at 119.
70. See C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM ESTABLISHMENT 159-88 (1964). Many of the acts and words cited in the text here and in the text
infra at notes 72-83 are open to divergent interpretations. Opposing advocates long
have squabbled over them.
One example of scholarly squabbling will suffice. In 1822 Jefferson, as rector
of the University of Virginia, agreed-with considerable reluctance it would
appear-to allow "some pious individuals . . . to establish their religious

schools on the confines of the University, so as to give their students ready
and convenient access and attendance on the scientific lectures of the University." Anyone who has attended many discussions or debates between churchstate activists knows as soon as this quotation is mentioned that he is in for an
extended exchange on the early 19th-century meaning of the word "confines."

The reverend gentleman from Fordham will contend that Jefferson meant "on
the grounds of the University." The learned gentleman from Yale will counter
that Jefferson clearly meant "off, but adjacent to, the campus." The urbane
gentleman from Harvard will suggest that Jefferson was being deliberately
ambiguous, and conclude that the reference cannot be scored for either side.
R. MORGAN, THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA

70 (2d ed. 1980) (footnote omitted). I have chosen not to replay these controversies,
but to note them and view them in the context of the general thinking of the Framers.
71. See infra notes 84-100 and accompanying text. Though the Founding Fathers emphasized their antiestablishmentarian principles, they recognized that religion,
as a source of morality, contributes to a desirable government and society. As Jefferson
wrote to John Adams,
But if the moral precepts innate in man, and made a part of his physical
constitution, as necessary for a social being, if the sublime doctrines of philan-

thropism and deism taught us by Jesus of Nazareth, in which all agree, conhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/3
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for advocates arguing the extent to which they would have required

separation.
A strict separationist, for example, might cite Madison's successful opposition to the 1785 Virginia bill for a general assessment to aid Christian teachers in the state; 2 his presidential veto of a bill to incorporate the Protestant
Episcopal Church in Alexandria, District of Columbia;7 3 his reluctance to issue executive proclamations of fasts and festivals; 7 4 Jefferson's refusal to issue
a presidential proclamation of a day for thanksgiving and prayer; 75 and his
insistence that theological schools be independent of the University of Virginia. 76 An accommodationist might note that Madison introduced into the
Virginia legislature a bill to punish Sabbath breakers; Madison and Jefferson
apparently failed to attack Virginia's tax exemption statute of 1777;78
Madison proclaimed a national day of fast, humiliation, and prayer during the
War of 1812;79 Jefferson, as Virginia's governor, proclaimed a day of
thanksgiving and prayer in 1779;11 as president, in a treaty with the Kaskasi
Indians, he provided financial assistance for supporting a priest and erecting a
stitute true religion, then, without it, this would be, as you again say, "something not fit to be named even, indeed, a hell."
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (May 5, 1817), reprinted in 15 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 108, 109 (A. Lipscomb ed 1904). This relation between
religion and society was the generally accepted thought of the era. See Whitson, supra
note 59 at 508-09.
72. See L. PFEFFER, supra note 62, at 109-13. The bill was introduced in 1784,
but not acted upon until 1785. Madison's opposition prompted him to write his Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, reprinted in Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 719 (Appendix II to Justice Douglas's dissent). At the time,
however, he kept his authorship secret. See Editorial Note, supra note 59, at 297.
73. See C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, supra note 70, at 176-78. At
the time, what is now Alexandria, Virginia, was part of the District of Columbia.
74. See L. PFEFFER, supra note 62, at 266-67. In drafting proclamations,
Madison was always careful to make them "absolutely indiscriminate, and merely recommendatory; or rather mere designationsof a day, on which all who thought proper
might unite in consecrating it to religious purposes, according to their own faith &
forms." Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 20, 1822), reprinted
in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 428, 432 (M. Meyers ed. 1973) (emphasis in original).
75. See R. HEALEY, JEFFERSON ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 130-34
(1962); L. PFEFFER, supra note 62, at 266.
76. See R. HEALEY, supra note 75, at 213-16; see also supra note 70. But see
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper (Nov. 2, 1822), reprinted in WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 403, 405 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904) (suggesting that theology students be permitted to attend university lectures, use its library and enjoy "every
other accommodation we can give them").
77. Reprinted in 2 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 555 (J. Boyd ed. 1950). Jefferson authored the bill. See EditorialNote on the Revisal of the Laws 1776-1786 in
id. at 305, 320.
78. See E. SMITH, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 250 (1972). The
statute exempted religious societies and educational institutions from taxes.
79. See C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, supra note 70, at 183.
80. See id. at 82.
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church;81 at the University of Virginia, he provided for the appointment of an
82
ethics professor who would deal with religious matters in a sympathetic way
and also expected students to attend the religious services of their respective
83
denominations.
Any inconsistencies between the articulated belief and actual practices of
these individuals may stem from a political compromise, a change of mind, or
a misreading of their beliefs. A brief overview of their philosophies might
prove helpful.
Jefferson believed that virtually all people possess an innate moral sense.
Those who lack this faculty can gain it through education and practice. 8 For
81. See id. at 167, 201. In his proposal to reorganize the College of William
and Mary, Jefferson proposed a mission to the Indian tribes, as opposed to an Indian
school as part of the college. See A Billfor Amending the Constitution of the College
of William and Mary, and Substituting More Certain Revenues for Its Support, reprinted in 2 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 535, 543 (J. Boyd ed. 1950). The description of the missionary's duties focuses exclusively on anthropological investigations. See
id. at 540.
82. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
83. See Report of Bd. of Visitors (Oct. 7, 1822), reprinted in N. CABELL,
EARLY HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

471, 475 (1856).

84. E.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), reprinted in 12 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 14, 15 (J. Boyd ed. 1955); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Law (June 13, 1814) reprinted in 14 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 138, 141-42 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904). See R. HEALEY, supra note
75, at 45-47; Appleby, What is Still American in the PoliticalPhilosophy of Thomas
Jefferson?, 39 Wm. & MARY Q. 287 (1982).
85. E.g., Report of the Commissionersfor the University of Virginia, reprinted
in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 332, 336 (M. Peterson ed. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as Rockfish Gap Report] (education "improves what in [a person's] nature was
vicious and perverse into qualities of virtue and social worth"); Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Peter Carr, supra note 84, at 15 (moral sense "may be strengthened by
exercise, as may any particular limb of the body;" reading good books encourages and
directs moral feelings); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Law, supra note 84,
at 142-43 (lack of moral sense can be remedied by education, appeals to reason, and
calculated appeals to self interest). See R. HEALEY, supra note 75, at 143-45. For the
formal teaching of ethics, Jefferson looked primarily to the classical Greek and Roman
authors. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 19, 1785), reprintedin
5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 82, 85 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), reprintedin 12 PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 14, 18 (J. Boyd ed. 1955). According to Jefferson, sophisticated learning
does not necessarily improve on common sense. "State a moral case to a ploughman
and a professor. The former will decide it as well, and often better than the latter,
because he has not been led astray by artificial rules." Id. at 15. Jefferson viewed liberal education as a way to select and prepare individuals of genius and virtue for positions of public leadership. See A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge,
reprinted in 2 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 527, 534 (J. Boyd ed. 1950). But he also
argued for education of the common people, "convinced that on their good sense we
may rely with the most security for the preservation of a due degree of liberty." Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in 12 PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 438, 442 (J. Boyd ed. 1955). Ultimately, however, Jefferson saw
the continuation of an agricultural society as essential to a virtuous society, since the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/3
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Jefferson, only that aspect of religion that deals with morality is true religion.86 Theological speculation could wreck the mind 87 and even make people
immoral by encouraging them to rely on nonrational doctrines instead of reason. 88 Consequently, he had no use for sectarianism, which arose from doctrinal dispute.89 Jefferson, moreover, had antipathy toward organized religion,
because he thought it promotes nonrational doctrines, 0 creates divisiveness, 1
and corrupts society whenever it joins forces with secular government. 92 Nonetheless, he believed that all religions share a common morality.98 Jefferson
thus would have acted to promote religious freedom for the individual. He
authored not only a Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 9 but also a Bill
for Punishing Disturbers of Religious Worship and Sabbath Breakers, the latter perhaps as a recognition of government responsibility to protect freedom of
worship. 96 Though he advocated that Virginia's proposed university have no
professor of divinity-lest sectarianism raise its head-he wished other profesoccupation does not beget subservience and venality. Id.; Notes on Virginia, reprinted
in 2 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 228, 229 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1903).
86. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (May 15, 1817), reprinted in
15 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 108, 109 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904). See R. HEALEY, supra note 75, at 159-61.
87. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Smith (Dec. 8, 1822), reprinted in
15 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 408, 409 (A. Libscomb ed. 1904).
88. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (June 15, 1813), reprinted in
9 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 386 (P. Ford ed. 1892-99); see Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (Jan 19, 1810), reprinted in 12 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 345 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Mathew Carey (Nov. 11, 1816), reprintedin 10 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 67,
68 (P.. Ford ed. 1892-99); R. Healey, supra note 75, at 162.
89. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Smith (Dec. 8, 1822), reprinted
in 15 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 408 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904).
90. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to J.P.P. Derieux (July 25, 1788), reprinted in 13 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 418 (J. Boyd ed. 1956).
91. Jefferson also saw division along class lines. In Virginia, he viewed establishment of religion as financial support for the affluent: "for the establishment was
truly of the religion of the rich, the dissenting sects being entirely composed of the less
affluent. . . ." Autobiography of Thomas Jefferson, reprinted in 1 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 69 (P. Ford ed. 1892).
92. E.g., Rockfish Gap Report, supra note 85, at 337. See D. MALONE, JEFFERSON THE VIRGINIAN 278 (1 JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME series 1948).
93. E.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Leiper (Jan. 21, 1809), reprinted in 12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 236, 237 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904). See
R. HEALEY, supra note 75, at 159-61, 208-09; cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Smith (Dec. 8, 1822), reprinted in 15 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 408,
410 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904) (both Trinitarianism and Unitarianism "make honest
men"). Jefferson believed Jesus's system of morality to be superior. See Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (Jan. 19, 1810), reprinted in 12 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 345 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904); see D. MALONE, JEFFERSON THE
PRESIDENT 203 (4 JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME series 1970).
94. Reprinted in 2 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).
95. Reprinted in 2 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 555 (J. Boyd ed. 1950). See

R.

HEALEY,

supra note 75, at 140.
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sors to teach morality, proofs of the existence of God, and Hebrew, Greek, and
Latin (tools for researching scripture), that is, matters common to all sects.9"
Madison's philosophy of religion is not as well developed in the historical
record. Yet, he believed strongly that religious freedom is an individual right
and that an established church is an evil. His concern about persecution of
Baptists in Virginia may well have been the issue that lured him into political
life.9 7 As for establishmentarianism, he observed that "union of religious sentiments begets a surprizing confidence and ecclesiastical establishments tend to
great ignorance and corruption all of which facilitate the execution of mischievous projects." 98 Whatever the basis of Madison's philosophy, he and Jefferson
apparently concurred on how they would resolve specific issues and frequently
worked in concert.9 9 The only exception of which I am aware is Madison's
opposition to Jefferson's proposal to exclude clergy from elective office-an
issue on which Jefferson changed his mind more than once.100
In summary, both Jefferson and Madison apparently recognized the importance of religion to the pursuit of the common good. Analysis of their
words and conduct, however, has led to differing conclusions on the degree of
church-state separation that they envisioned. Their philosophies and experiences with sectarianism and establishmentarianism led to their emphasis on
safeguarding religious liberty against the state. Their emphasis lay on the negative consequences for free exercise when one particular church enjoys close
identification with the government. They played the primary role in drafting
the establishment clause,101 which prevents establishment of a national
96. Rockfish Gap Report, supra note 85, at 337-43. Jefferson also favored ac-

commodating the various sects by encouraging them to establish their own respective
professorships on the confines of the university. See supra note 70. As a member of the
Board of Visitors, he also agreed that "their students may attend lectures [at the uni-

versity], and have free use of our library, and every other accommodation we can give
them; preserving, however, their independence of us and of each other." Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper (Nov. 2, 1822), reprinted in 15 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 403, 405 (1903). He also hoped that "by bringing the sects together, and mixing them with the mass of other students, we shall soften their asperi-

ties, liberalize and neutralize their prejudices, and make the general religion a religion
of peace, reason, and morality." Id. at 406.
97. See Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Jan. 24, 1774), reprinted in 1 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 104, 107 n.9 (W. Hutchinson & W. Rachal
ed. 1962).
98. Id. at 105.
99. See A. KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION 2332, 40-41 (1950). See generally H. ECKENRODE, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
IN VIRGINIA (1910); E. SMITH, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 27-44
(1972).
100. See R.

HEALEY,

supra note 75, at 136-38.

101. The first amendment's language resulted from the efforts of many Congressional members. See C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, supra note 70, at 12342. With Jefferson in France, Madison took the lead in Congress in pressing for the
Bill of Rights. See 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 983-84, 1006-09
(B. Schwartz ed. 1971). Jefferson and Madison have received the credit for the religion
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/3
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church.102 They thus did not forbid states to establish religions, apparently in
the belief that federal intrusion was more serious a matter than were the evils
associated with established churches. 10 3 The result of this balance of concerns
at least suggests a recognition of church and state was tolerable in important
units of government. Antiestablishmentarianism, then, was not so strong a
force that it negated any thought of church-state accommodation; the establishment clause tolerated a type of accommodation that today would be
unthinkable.
Jefferson and Madison, then, strongly advocated religious autonomy for
groups and individuals and saw a connection between religion and a virtuous
society. Yet, the distaste for organized religion and sectarianism discouraged
an accommodating interplay between church and state. Their public actions,
however, create ambiguity about the extent of accommodation they would permit. Moreover, because these men acted out of philosophical principle as well
as legal mandate, it is impossible definitively to determine which accommoda104
tions they considered merely inadvisable and which unconstitutional.
Perhaps a more profitable way to relate my thesis to the thinking of the
constitutional era is to view religion in the context of Madisonian political
theory.10 5 A primary concern of Madison was the injurious effect of factions.
Madison defined a faction as "a number of citizens amounting to a majority or
minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse
clauses because of the precedent set by their efforts in Virginia to enact the Statute of
Religious Liberty. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,.11-13 (1947).
Justice Rehnquist has argued that Madison sponsored the Bill of Rights "as an advo-

cate of sensible legislative compromise, not as an advocate of incorporating the Virginia

Statute of Religious Liberty into the United States Constitution." Wallace v. Jaffree,

105 S. Ct. 2479, 2512 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
Other schools of thought also influenced the Framers, most notably Roger Wil-

liams' argument that separation would protect the church against corruption by the
state. See M. HowE, supra note 55, at 1-31.
102. The clause also has been viewed as not prohibiting federal courts from respecting state-level action supporting religion. See M. HOWE, supra note 55, at 11-23.
103. See id., at 29-31. In contrast, concern for federalism did not stand in the
way of insistence on the right to trial by jury in state courts. See, e.g., Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in 12 PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 438, 440 (J. Boyd ed. 1955).
104. See, e.g., R. HEALEY, supra note 75, at 15, 132-40, 215-16.
105. The following account primarily relies on Madison's writings in THE FEDERALIST, particularly Numbers 10 and 51. The following descriptive paragraphs are an
attempt at a faithful paraphrase. Madison believed that THE FEDERALIST mirrored the
sentiments of the Framers:
"The Federalist" may fairly enough be regarded as the most authentic exposition of the text of the federal Constitution, as understood by the body which
prepared and the Authority which accepted it. Yet it did not foresee all the
misconstructions which have occurred, nor prevent some that it did foresee
. *'*[N]either of the great rival parties have acquiesced in all its comments.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 8, 1825), reprinted in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 218, 219 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
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of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens or the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."' 6 According to Madison, the
causes of factions are not removable, and moral and religious motives are inadequate to control them. 107 These clashing interests, moreover, are not necessarily susceptible to an adjustment that will render them subservient to the
public good. Enlightened leaders capable of making such adjustments will not
always be at the helm, and, in many cases, such an adjustment is not possible.
The goal, then, is control of factions.
Majority rule, according to Madison, ultimately controls minority factions. As for majority factions, a republic based on a scheme of representation
offers a twofold cure. First, the delegation of government to a small number of
elected officials helps to "refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them
through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best
discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of
justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.110 8 Second, an extensive republic, as opposed to a small one, furnishes a
wider choice of proper guardians of the public weal. Its size and diversity of
interests also works to favor the election of virtuous leaders, in part because a
majority will be less likely to share a common deleterious motive, and those
sharing such a motive will find it harder to discover their strength and act in
unison. The underlying assumption is that the American people have a virtuous spirit that prevails when the electorate acts within the structure of an
extensive republican government.0 9 Though factions and unvirtuous leaders
may have their triumphs, "the process of elections . . . will most certainly

extract from the mass of the society the purest and noblest characters which it
contains ... .",,0 Madison also favored further checks on leaders, including
separation of powers, checks and balances, and federalism."'
Throughout the past century, Madison's political theory has been the subject of extensive critiques."12 Described broadly, however, it presents a perspective relevant to contemporary politics. Madison recognized a pluralistic
society of competing interests. He acknowledged that selfish interests and individuals sometimes win out. Nonetheless, he believed that, over the long run,
106. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 58, at 130.
107. Id. at 130-31.
108.

Id. at 134.

109. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 374, 377, 379 (J. Madison) (B.
Wright ed. 1961); G. WILLS, supra note 5, at 179-92; Shklar, supra note 58, at 950-51.
110. Vices of the PoliticalSystem of the United States, reprinted in 9 PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 345, 357 (R. Rutland & W. Rachal ed. 1975).
11I. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 58.
112. See, e.g., D. ADAIR, FAME AND
AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION

THE FOUNDING FATHERS 93-106 (1974); C.
OF THE CONSTITUTION 156-58 (1913); J.
BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY 18-23, 218 (1963); R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO
BEARD,

(1956); G. WILLS, supra note 5. Prior to Beard's work, THE
FEDERALIST No. 10 failed to receive particular attention from commentators. For an
historiography on the Tenth Federalist, see D. ADAIR at 75-92; G. WILLS at xiv-xxii.
DEMOCRATIC THEORY
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the virtue of the electorate would prevail and public minded leaders usually
would have charge of government. Despite, then, Madison's dark view of a
society ridden with selfish interests, he ultimately offered a bright view of a
society that is rooted in the spirit of the American people and the structures of
American government.
As for religion, Madison believed that religious sentiments and morality
constitute too weak a force to dissipate factions: "They are not found to be
adequate controls ...on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose

their efficacy in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful." 11 3 Yet he relied
on the political system to produce virtuous leaders for whom religious sentiments and morality presumably would be qualities of character.""' Madison
failed to articulate a positive role for organized religion in the political system.
In the Federalist, he offered religious sects as an illustration of factions that
the political system would keep under control.1 25 In Madison's thinking, then,
organized religion can play a deleterious role, and religion needs no formal
support from the political system to assure that it will be a beneficial force on
the electorate and the elected.11
My view differs from Madison's. I do not believe one can expect religious
sentiments to have the strength to influence society without the existence of
strong, organized religion. To be sure, religious individuals always play an important role in keeping honest both society and religious sects. Religious individuals alone, however, are not enough. Nor can one rely on the individual's
innate religious and moral sentiments. Even Jefferson recognized the need to
develop these qualities through education. I also disagree with Madison, because I believe that organized religion can be a beneficial force in developing
the religious and moral sentiments that Madison assumed would be at work in
society.113
113. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 58, at 133. He stated this belief in
stronger words in a precursor to THE FEDERALIST No. 10-Vices of the PoliticalSystem of the United States, reprinted in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 345, 356-57 (R.
Rutland & W. Rachal ed. 1975).
114. See supra text accompanying note 110.
115. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 supra note 58, at 132 and THE FEDERALIST No.
51, supra note 58, at 358-59; see also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson
(Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in 12 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 270, 278 (J. Boyd ed.
1955).
116. See, e.g., Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 719 (1970) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("for it is known that [Christianity] both existed and flourished, not only
without the support of human laws, but in spite of every opposition from them"); Letter from James Madison to Rev. Adams (1832), reprinted in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 484 (G. Hunt ed. 1900-10) (religion is at its best and purest without the
support of government).
117. My position finds support in the notion of mediating structures. Mediating
structures, such as the neighborhood, the family, the voluntary association, and the
church, are those institutions standing between the individual in his or her private life
and the large institutions of public life. See P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER
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As for the fear that religious forces cause factionalism, Madison noted
that pluralism keeps the various sects under control. 1 8 My analysis recognizes
that pluralism may work too well. The specific political position of a given
religion may not succeed regardless of the authenticity of its claim to virtue.
That interest must still compete with the wants of other religions and still
other interests. The analysis, however, still shares Madison's optimism that
virtue prevails in the long run.
My thesis, then, parts from Madison's political theory by taking a bleaker
view of the power of virtue to hold its own in a pluralistic society. Though it
recognizes the soundness of the principles of church-state separation, it does
not assume that religious interests always enjoy the innate strength to exist as
pluralistic influences. It therefore insists on liberal church-state accommodation. In this way, it seeks to insure that interests formally contributing a virtuous dimension to political decisionmaking enjoy sufficient clout not just to survive, but to make a significant contribution.
II.

SUPREME COURT ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RELIGION'S SECULAR
CONTRIBUTIONS

The Supreme Court only fleetingly has acknowledged religion's secular
contribution to the political process. The Court, however, has raised themes
that are hospitable to this acknowledgment. Three themes recognize the positive role of religion in American life: the religious dimension of the nation's
history and culture; the common contribution of free exercise and free expression to the political process; and the role of religious institutions in meeting
society's secular needs. A brief examination of these themes demonstrates that
my argument is hardly a radical departure from traditional thinking about the
religion clauses.
A.

Religion's Historicaland Cultural Roles

The Court has used historical and cultural arguments in three ways to
further accommodationist positions. First, the Court frequently has emphasized that historically and culturally, American society has a religious character, and it has used this assertion to set out a principle of liberal accommodation.1 19 The strongest, most quoted declaration of this assertion appears in
PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 2 (1977). As the

value generating and value maintaining agencies in society, they play an essential role
in a vital democratic society. See id. at 6. Within the family and between the family
and society, the church is the primary agent for bearing and transmitting society's
operative values. See id. at 30.
118. See supra note 115; see also Curry, James Madison and the Burger Court:
Converging Views of Church-StateSeparation, 56 IND. L.J. 615, 618-20 (1981).
119. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1360-61 (1984); Marsh v.
Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3336 (1983); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 638-39
(1978) (Brennan, J., concurring); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970);
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/3
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Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Zorach v. Clauson,120 which upheld a
released time program permitting public school children to receive off-premises religious instruction:
We are a religious people, whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.
We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make room for a
wide variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary . . . . [A permissible accommodationist law] respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual
needs.12
The Court regularly has noted this underlying premise to the general principle
of accommodation, even when it has invalidated an arguably permissible ac122
commodationist law in the case at bar.
Second, the Court has invoked the long historical acceptance of a particular practice as evidence that the practice does not run afoul of the religion
clauses. 123 The evidence is particularly persuasive to the Court when the practice enjoyed acceptance in the Framers' era and, therefore, presumably did not
violate the separationist principle in their eyes. These circumstances were present in Walz v. Tax Commission,1 24 upholding tax exemptions for religious
organizations, and Marsh v. Chambers, 25 validating the opening of legislative
sessions with a prayer by a paid chaplain. Lynch v. Donnelly assumed that the
celebration of Christmas had enjoyed governmental acceptance from the country's beginning, and it permitted a municipality to include a creche in its
126
Christmas display.
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212-14 (1963); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 313-14 (1952).
120. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
121. Id. at 313-14; see also Justice Douglas's dissent in McGowan v. Md., 366
U.S. 420, 562-63 (1961), recognizing that society's institutions are founded on the belief that there is an authority higher than the state's authority. He limited the practical
consequences of the assertion by stating that "if a religious leaven is to be worked into
the affairs of our people, it is to be done by the individuals and groups, not by the
Government." Id. at 563.
122. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792 (1973);
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212-14 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
441-43 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
123. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1360-61, 1365 (1984); Marsh v.
Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3332-36 (1983); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 67678 (1970).
124. 397 U.S. 664, 676-78 (1970).
125. 103 S.Ct. 3330, 3332-36 (1983).
126. The majority's language is careful. It describes the creche as a "symbol of a
particular historic religious event, [that is included] as a part of a celebration acknowledged in the Western World for 20 centuries, and in this country by the people, by the
Executive Branch, by the Congress, and the courts for two centuries. . . " 104 S. Ct.
1355, 1365 (1984). The Court thus did not state that the American people and government have approved or acknowledged creche displays for two centuries, but only that
they have acknowledged Christmas. The Court failed to explain exactly what governmental actions comprise the acknowledgment. As Justice Brennan's dissent notes, the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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Third, in some free exercise cases, the Court has pointed out that such
practices as pamphleteering are historic tools in the fight for religious freedom
and are also in the best tradition of free expression. 127 These discussions recognize that28 free exercise joins free expression as essentials in the political
system. "

In the first two instances, the Court has discussed history to dispel fears
that a particular law or practice contributes to a creeping establishmentarianism. For example, the Court has stated that the long practice of a paid chaplain offering a legislative prayer has not advanced the state toward religious
establishment; therefore, history gives abundant assurance that legislative
chaplains pose no threat to the separationist principle. 129 The Court, however,
also has used history as evidence of a tradition of benevolent neutrality. The
necessity of protecting religious autonomy serves as one justification for this
neutrality. 30 The Court also has found in history an acknowledgment that
religion makes a positive contribution to society. Uncontroverted is the recognition that many legal, political, and moral values derive from religious teachings.1 31 Cases note religious references in public rituals like Thanksgiving Day
and Christmas proclamations;13 2 they also mention divine guidance and its
widespread celebration of Christmas in its present form did not emerge until well into
the nineteenth century. Previously, hostility to the holiday by many denominations
made the celebration a controversial subject. Id. at 1383-86. Longstanding tradition,
then, still evidences the harmony of public, religiously oriented Christmas displays with
the establishment clause, but the historical argument is less strong than in Marsh and
Walz, in which specific government practices existed during the Framer's era.
127. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1945); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring); Jones v. Opelika, 316
U.S. 584, 619 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
128. See Part II, § B, infra.
129. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3337 (1983).
130. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672, 676-78 (1970); Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310
(1940).
131. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
132. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1360-61 (1984); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1951). Justice Brennan has suggested that such practices as designating "In God We Trust" as the national motto and referring to God in

the Pledge of Allegiance could be viewed as forms of "ceremonial deism," in which rote

repetition has deprived them of any significant religious content. Lynch at 1381 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Yet he also admitted that these references "are uniquely suited to
serve such wholly secular purposes as solemnizing public occasions, or inspiring commitment to meet some national challenge in a manner that simply could not be fully
served in our culture if government were limited to purely non-religious phrases." Id.
This unique quality, however, suggests a nonsecular dimension, even though the practices are "so conventional and uncontroversial as to be constitutional." Sutherland,
Book Review, 40 IND. L.J. 83, 86 (1964).
Justice Brennan might have considered the historian's and sociologist's concept of
American civil religion. It is the set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals that express the
public religious dimension, which, in turn, reflects the common elements of religious
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/3
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value in the deliberations and pronouncements of past and present public
officials.' 3
These acknowledgments admittedly are thin strands in the judicial analyses, but my argument is a fair one. Our nation enjoys a lengthy history of
public religious practices and accommodations. The cases mention this history
in a positive light and recognize the wholesome contribution of religious values
to the national character. The Court has not invoked culture and history to
require a mere tolerance of religion. Instead, it has emphasized that a stark
neutrality would create a perception of hostility to religion that contradicts
American history and culture.'" The Court therefore has set forth benevolent
neutrality as the guiding principle. 35 This accommodationist approach implicitly recognizes that the American religious tradition is salutary, rather than
unfortunate, and should be permitted to flourish. The Court, then, has invoked
history and culture to celebrate the contribution of the nation's religious character to society and government.136
B.

The Free Exercise-Free Expression Contribution

The kindred roles of religious free exercise and free press in the political
orientation that a great majority of Americans share. See R. BELLAH, Civil Religion in
America, in BEYOND BELIEF 168, 171 (1970), reprintedfrom 96 DAEDALUS 1 (1967).
See generally AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION (R. Richey & D. Jones ed. 1974); R. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT (1975); M. NOVAK, CHOOSING OUR KING 105-59
(1974); Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 Sup. CT. REV.
123; A.A.L.S. Law and Religion Panel: Law as Our Civil Religion, 31 MERCER L.
REV. 477 (1980). "[C]ivil religion at its best is a genuine apprehension of universal and
transcendent religious reality as seen in. .. the experience of the American people."
R. BELLAH, supra at 179. From this perspective the national motto, oaths of office, and

the like are more than hollow rituals. American civil religion is nondenominational;
therefore including the creche within its ambit presents difficulty unless one broadens
the civil religion concept to include a benevolent accommodation of mainstream sectarian religious themes. One also might identify a latitudinarian Christianity as a major
subcategory of American civil religion and recognize public religious Christmas displays as one of its symbols.
133. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1360 (1984).
134. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1951); McCollum v. Board
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948).
135. The phrase "benevolent neutrality" first appears in Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 669, 676 (1970).
136. To be sure, historical and cultural arguments do not always persuade the
Court or individual justices. A judicial opinion may reject the accuracy of the historical

argument. E.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1382-86 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). An opinion also may invoke history to justify a policy of church-state separation and find that the policy invalidates a traditional law or practice. E.g., School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213-14 (1963). It also may find that despite a law's
historical roots, it nonetheless fails to survive an ahistoric analytical test for constitutionality. E.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion). The sometime vulnerability of historical and cultural arguments does not refute
my point, but merely demonstrates that other arguments can be more persuasive.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985

25

Missouri
Law Review,
50, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 3
MISSOURI
LAWVol.
REVIEW

[Vol. 50

process find recognition in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases concerning religious
pamphleteering and evangelizing in public places.13 7 In the 1940's and early
1950's, the Court used these cases to develop ways in which to apply the free
expression-free speech and free press-and free exercise clauses to state and
local licensing laws that restricted door-to-door canvassing and public speaking. The Court struck down the laws in most of these cases by employing an
analysis that invoked free expression and free exercise arguments without
clearly distinguishing between the two."" In addition to recognizing the value
of the constitutional guarantees in protecting individual autonomy against the
state's power, 139 the decisions also recognized the value of both free expression
and free exercise in contributing to the working of a democracy. The recurring, albeit sketchily developed theme is that both contribute to knowledge,
40
discussion, and hence to opinion and right conduct.1
The cases rely on both the religious and free expression guarantees,
4
though the Court could have decided the cases solely on the latter ground.1 '
Prior to Cantwell v. Connecticut, 42 the Court had decided two cases for the
137. E.g. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Kunz v. New York, 340
U.S. 290 (1951); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1945); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
138. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 137.
139. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940). Individual autonomy is the prime concern in
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639-42 (1943) (invalidating requirement that school children salute the flag).
140. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293 (1951) (streets and parks
"have immemorially... been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions,") (quoting Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S.
496, 515 (1939)); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1945) (exercise of liberties of
free press and religion "lies at the foundation of free government by free men," quoting
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)); Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 584, 594-95
(1942) ("To proscribe the dissemination of doctrines or arguments.., is to destroy the
principal bases of democracy-knowledge and discussion.") (holding against the Witnesses); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (religious and political
liberties are "essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy").
141. In Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), for example, the Court
invalidated an anti-solicitation ordinance solely on free speech and free press grounds,
but three members of the five member majority also rested their decisions on the free
exercise clause. Id. at 149 (Murphy, J., concurring with Douglas, J., and Rutledge, J.).
In these sorts of cases, the protection offered by the free exercise and free speech guarantees appears to be coextensive. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 652 (1981); id. at 659 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring
and dissenting). Opposition to making free exercise protection more extensive surfaces
in some cases. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164-65 (1944); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 179 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring); R. MoRGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION

66-68 (1972).

142. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (employing the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to apply the free exercise clause to the states).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/3

26

1985]

Sirico: Sirico: Secular Contribution of Religion to the Political Process:

FIRST AMENDMENT AND SCHOOL AID

Witnesses by invoking only the free speech and free press clauses.1 43 Though
Cantwell recognized the applicability of the free exercise clause to
the states,
1
it also relied on free expression arguments to justify its decision. "
Perhaps Cantwell's invocation of the free exercise clause was inevitable,
since the offending statute authorized a public official to decide whether a solicitation was for a religious purpose and therefore permissible.1 45 Yet, subsequent cases with similar fact patterns concerned laws that were religiously
neutral on their face. 46 The Court nonetheless included the free exercise
clause in its arguments, though the inclusion was apparently unnecessary.
The inclusion may well have arisen out of a belief that the free exercise
claim made the opinions more persuasive.1 47 Perhaps the use of both the free
exercise and free expression arguments as part of an undifferentiated analysis
worked to strengthen both doctrines at this stage of their development, with
each bolstering the other. By applying the free exercise argument to an issue
for which the free expression doctrine appeared controlling, the Court increased the number of situations in which free exercise arguments could be
invoked. Perhaps the free exercise argument aided in justifying the application
of the free expression doctrine to conduct, as opposed to merely pure speech.1 48
With Cantwell, the Court recognized limits on regulating religious activity as
well as the prohibition on regulating religious belief. Though the Court already had begun extending the free expression doctrine to conduct, the analogous development under the free exercise doctrine must have given persuasive
support to the extension.1 49 In any case, the use of a common argument led the
Court to hold that free exercise, as well as free expression, is essential to promoting the communication of ideas and diversity of opinion, which play a critical role in the political process.
C.

The Contribution of Religious Institutions

Supreme Court cases also have recognized that religious institutions contribute to furthering society's secular goals. The recognition arises in establishment clause cases 150 in which the Court must determine whether a secular, as
opposed to religious purpose underlies legislation that arguably benefits reli143. Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
144. 310 U.S. at 303-10.
145. See id. at 301-02.
146. See, e.g., Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
147. See R. MORGAN, supra note 141, at 73-74.
148. See id. at 73.
149. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 143.
150. Free exercise cases that focus on the conduct of religious individuals also
could be interpreted as acknowledging the contributions of the religious groups to
which the individuals belong. See Sec. II.B supra.
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gion.' 51 The Court regularly has deferred to legislative statements of secular
purpose, except in cases in which the nonsecular purpose was obvious-for
example, a statute that forbids teaching evolution in public schools15 2 or that
requires posting the Ten Commandments in public classrooms (as a reminder
of the religious roots of the Western legal code). 53 In an area populated by
controversial cases, the ability of legislative bodies routinely to propose statements of purpose that the judiciary finds uncontroversial is noteworthy. The
Court rarely has felt the need to closely analyze these statements.1 5 4 In some
instances, the Court has fleshed out 1 55 or even inferred 5 6 a legislative purpose
that was sketchy or nonexistent. The near invulnerability of these statements
to judicial attack suggests a strong societal consensus favoring the purposes
they set forth.
Judicially acknowledged contributions of religious institutions fall into
two categories: the general benefits of religion to society, and the specific benefits conferred by religions that sponsor educational institutions. In Walz v. Tax
Commission, the Court upheld a property tax exemption for religious institutions as well as other social service and nonprofit organizations. 157 It inferred a
secular legislative purpose of not inhibiting the activities of certain institutions
that exist harmoniously with the community and foster its moral and mental
improvement. Walz perhaps offers the most direct acknowledgment of the general secular contributions of religious institutions. There, the Court refused to
limit the notion of valid public purpose to assisting religions only insofar as
they furnish social welfare services or perform other good works.1 58 The fear of
potential administrative entanglement was the Court's articulated reason for
rejecting the provision of these services as a criterion for determining which
particular religious institutions qualify for a tax exemption. 59 Implicit, then, is
a recognition that religion makes a secular contribution in addition to its social
services contribution. The Court has found that the contribution to "mental or
151. The requirement that legislation have a secular purpose is the first prong of
the Supreme Court's current test for determining the constitutionality of legislation
that arguably benefits one religion over another or religion over nonreligion. See Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For further discussion, see infra notes 187-99 and
accompanying text.
152. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
153. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
154. The most extensive discussions of secular'purpose appear in Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1362-63 (1984), and Walz v. Tax Comm'n 397 U.S. 664, 67174 (1970).
155. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 & n.5 (1977); Roemer v.
Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 740-41, 754 (1976).
156. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 n.4 (1983); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-74 (1970); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18
(1947).
157. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
158. Id. at 674.
159. Id. at 674-76.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/3

28

Sirico: Sirico: Secular Contribution of Religion to the Political Process:

FIRST AMENDMENT AND SCHOOL AID

moral improvement"160 alone is sufficient to justify a tax exemption for religious institutions. Permitting the exemptions suggests an acknowledgment that
the contributions are significant. They justify denying government a potential
source of income. They also justify protecting churches in areas with high
property values. In some instances, protection from the tax burden permits less
affluent churches to survive and to continue to make the contribution that
stems from religious exercise.
Acknowledgment of concrete contributions of religious institutions arises
in cases concerned with state aid to religiously-affiliated schools.161 In recognizing a valid secular purpose in aiding them and their students, the Court has
expressly ratified three values that the aid promotes: financial relief for the
state, educational diversity, and excellence in public education.
The privately-funded schools make available alternatives to the state's
educational programs. In the absence of the alternatives, the state would have
to carry a heavier financial burden in order to meet the increased educational
demands posed by students it previously had not served. Religious schools,
then, lighten the financial obligations of the state and its taxpayers.12 As an
educational alternative, the schools also furnish diversity in educational programs and help insure the vitality of a pluralistic society.' 6 3 They also provide
a yardstick 4against which to measure public education and serve as a competi16
tive spur.
In some instances, a religious institution may further a secular goal by
invoking religious concerns to urge conduct that a legislature has determined
to be a desirable goal for entirely secular reasons. Sunday closing laws offer an
example. A religious group may encourage citizens to set aside Sunday for
worship and reflection, and the state may wish to set it aside as a day of rest
and relaxation.165 Of course, such harmony between religious institutions and
the state is not desirable in all instances. Disagreement acts as a desirable
check on government when religious institutions believe government is acting
160.

Id. at 672, quoting N.Y.

REAL PROP. TAX LAW

REAL PROP. TAX LAW

§ 420(1), amended by N.Y.

§ 420-a (McKinney 1984).

161. See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3230 (1985);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678

(1971). I use the word "schools" to include colleges and universities as well as primary
schools and high schools.

162. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983); Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 764-65 (1973).

163. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 162.

See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983).
165. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430 (1961); see also, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318-19 (1980) (upholding ban on use of Medicaid funds
for abortions where ban was in agreement with doctrines of some religious groups, but
also had the independent secular purpose of encouraging childbirth). The Court's reluctance to attribute unconstitutional motivation to government action reduces the risk of
its finding an improper religious motivation. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,
394-95 (1983).
164.
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improperly. In some instances, however, a religious institution will support
government conduct that is unconstitutional or inappropriate. My thesis, however, accords with the apparent judicial consensus that religious institutions
generally are a salutary force.
D. Some Reflections
The Supreme Court thus has recognized religion's general contribution to
society and the political process. According to the Court, religious institutions
and religion as an historic and cultural influence have helped shape desirable
secular values and the national character. The free exercise clause has joined
with the free speech and free press clauses in promoting communication of
ideas and diversity of opinion and thus has benefited the political process. In
addition to making these general contributions, some religious institutions also
have made a concrete contribution by providing schools as an alternative to
public education. If the opportunity presented itself, presumably the Court
also would recognize the positive contribution of religious institutions in offering social welfare services. 166
None of these acknowledgments is particularly controversial, except perhaps to those with strong anti-religious feelings. The Court has not found it
necessary to defend its acknowledgments or those embodied in legislative
statements of purpose. The lack of controversy suggests that these contributions are taken for granted. This observation invites two inquiries: why has the
Court not allocated a weightier role to the accepted notion of religion's secular
contribution, and would such an allocation make a difference in the outcome
of close cases.
I venture a brief response. In some free exercise and establishment clause
cases, other religiously oriented policy concerns have proven sufficiently strong
to make unnecessary the consideration of an additional policy concern. In free
exercise cases concerning constitutional exemptions from state regulations, religion's secular contribution simply has failed to receive attention. In establishment clause cases dealing with government benefits to religion or particular
religions, the Court's understanding of the clause's origins has encouraged a
preoccupation with the dangers of church-state relationships. The judicial test
that the Court applies in these cases contains a bias reflecting this
preoccupation.
In cases that treat free exercise and free expression as concurrent concerns-for example, the Jehovah's Witness cases-the force of the free expres166. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970), the Court upheld property tax exemptions for religious institutions and refused to justify the exemption on
the social welfare services that churches provide. It feared that reliance on this criterion would result in administrative entanglement of church and state. The Court, however, recognized that churches furnish services that the state also frequently sponsors.
Hence it implicitly recognized that churches furnishing these services perform a public
function.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/3
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sion argument generally has proven sufficient to guard the religious interest. 6 7
The cases do not appear to make the protection offered by one guaranty more
extensive than that offered by the other.'6 8 In these cases, the free expression
concerns that predominate in the analyses' 69 are so overwhelming that added
attention to religion's secular contribution probably would not affect the judicial decisions.
In other free exercise cases, concern for religious autonomy has served as
the prime value. It has proven strikingly powerful in cases dealing with inquiries into the verity of religious beliefs 7 0° and in cases concerning internal ecclesiastical disputes.' 7 ' The Court consistently has refused to pass judgment on
the former or intrude into the latter. In these cases, any other religiously oriented concern doubtlessly would be viewed as surplusage.
The concern for religious autonomy also has been central in challenges to
state regulations that arguably have a coercive effect on the free exercise of
religious minorities-the Sherbert v. Verner'72 line of cases. In only four cases
17 3
have these challenges resulted in judicially mandated religious exemptions.
167. Though the Court decided these cases on both free exercise and free expression grounds, from today's perspective the arguments appear based on the principles
associated with guarantees of free speech and free press. See supra note 141 and text
accompanying notes 141-49.
168. See supra note 141.
169. See supra note 141 and text accompanying notes 141-49.
170. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
171. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). For an analysis of
this line of cases, see Sirico, The ConstitutionalDimensions of Church Property Disputes, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1981).
172. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In a related line of cases, individuals have argued that
government action infringed on their free exercise rights, even though no government
mandate compelled them to act in violation of their religious beliefs. See, e.g., Badoni
v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981) (rejecting claim that government operation of dam and lack of control over tourists unconstitutionally interfered with Navajo religious practices at sacred area); Sequoyah v.
T.V.A., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980) (rejecting Cherokee constitutional claim that
completion of dam would flood sacred homeland and destroy important religious sites);
N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (rejecting claim that construction of road in a region that Native Americans
hold sacred and use for rites would violate free exercise rights); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F.
Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982) (rejecting claim that government construction of road and
lack of control over tourists unconstitutionally disturbed Native American sacred area
and interfered with religious rites); Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 8 I.L.R. 3073 (D.D.C.
June 15, 1981) (rejecting claim that further development of recreational area would
unconstitutionally disturb deities inhabiting the area). For a discussion, see Comment,
A Non-Conflict Approach to the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 131 U. PA. L.
REv. 1175 (1983).

173. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488 (1961). McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), arguably might be added to this
list. The Court unanimously invalidated a state law disqualifying ministers from servPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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The small number of victories of those seeking exemptions suggests that they
consider ways to bolster their arguments. In line with my thesis, they might
argue that courts should give weight to the contribution made by those whose
religions demand nonconformity with government mandates. These minorities
play a prophetic role17 4 in challenging societal norms on matters ranging from
the necessity of military service to the necessity of mandatory education.
In establishment clause cases, the Court's interpretation of the clause's
origins also creates a bias favoring strict separation of church and state. Beginning with Everson v. Board of Education,75 the Court developed a history
that portrayed the Framers as exclusively Jeffersonian in their fears that relations between church and state would lead to religious persecution and civil
strife.17 6 Though the Court since has softened this interpretation and described
ing as legislators. A plurality decided the case on free exercise grounds. Justice Stewart
invoked Torcaso to find the law unconstitutional. Id. at 642-43 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).

-

The Court has not found a constitutional requirement to exempt religious conscientious objectors from military service. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971). It has broadly interpreted statutory exemptions for religious objectors. See
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (plurality opinion); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
In other situations, state courts have found a constitutional mandate to grant exemptions from government imposed rules. See, e.g., Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068
(Alaska 1979) (reversing Native American's conviction for shooting and transporting
moose out of season for religious funeral ceremony); Rankin v. Commission on Professional Competence, 24 Cal. 3d 167, 593 P.2d 852, 154 Cal. Rptr. 907 (finding reasonable duty to accommodate teacher who required several absences a year for religious
observances), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 986 (1979); McMillan v. State, 258 Md.
147, 265 A.2d 453 (1970) (exempting criminal defendant from trial court order to
remove religious headgear); Dotter v. Maine Employment Sec. Comm'n, 435 A.2d
1368 (1981) (granting unemployment benefits to employee who lost job for attending
religious festival and thus being absent from work); In re Adoption of "E", 59 N.J. 36,
279 A.2d 785 (1971) (rejecting state requirement that prospective adoptive parents
believe in a Supreme Being); State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750
(1976) (permitting children to attend religious schools without state accreditation);
West Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate, 24 Ohio Misc. 66, 261 N.E.2d 196 (1969) (finding state action and rejecting covenant that would exclude churches from residential
area); Whitehorn v. Oklahoma, 561 P.2d 539 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977), (following People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964)) (both cases
permitting Native American Church members to use peyote in religious ceremonies);
State v. Everly, 150 W. Va. 423, 146 S.E.2d 705 (1966) (granting exemption from jury
duty because of personal religious beliefs).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 32-39. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 223-24 (1971) offers a nod in this general direction:
We must not forget that in the Middle Ages important values of the civilization of the Western World were preserved by members of religious orders who
isolated themselves from all worldly influences against great obstacles. There
can be no assumption that today's majority is "right" and the Amish and
others like them are "wrong."
175. 330 U.S. 1, 8-16 (1947); id. at 33-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
176. See id.; see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 427-31 (1962); Torcaso v.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/3

32

1985]

Sirico: Sirico: Secular Contribution of Religion to the Political Process:

FIRST AMENDMENT AND SCHOOL AID

the wall between church and state as less than impenetrable, 7 7 the Jeffersonian metaphor for strict separation remains a frequent starting point in judi17
cial discussions of the establishment clause. 1
The formal judicial tests in establishment clause cases have not taken the
form of expressly balancing competing concerns, such as religion's secular contribution. Discussions of such matters as benevolent neutrality179 and historic
and cultural traditions'8 0 arise in the cases and presumably influence the decisions, but the Court leaves very unclear their degree of actual influence and
the method for weighing their significance.18 '
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 490-92 (1961); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
213-17 (1948); L. TRIBE, supra note 4, § 14-4 at 818 & n.17 (1978) (later Courts have
accepted the separatist perspective as historical truth, though its accuracy has been
disputed vigorously). For a critical assesment of this historical analysis, see Wallace v.
Jaffree, 105 S. Ct 2479, 2508-14 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Though Everson upheld a form of indirect aid to parents of parochial school children, the Court's separatist perspective provoked criticism from contemporary accommodationists. See R. MORGAN, supra note 141, at 93-93. Justice Black, a primary
author of the Court's history, harbored hostility toward the Roman Catholic church.
His library contained a marked, personally indexed copy of Paul Blanshard's AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER (1949), a popular anti-Catholic polemic. See G.
DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION

268 (1977). Justice Black's son

has written:
The Ku Klux Klan and Daddy, so far as I could tell, had one thing in common. He suspected the Catholic Church. He used to read all of Paul Blanshard's books exposing the power abuse in the Catholic Church. He thought
the Pope and bishops had too much power and property. He resented the fact
that rental property owned by the Church was not taxed; he felt they got
most of their revenue from the poor and did not return enough of it.
H.

BLACK, JR.,

My FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE 104 (1975). Others have noted a strand

of anti-Catholicism in the Court's jurisprudence of the religious clauses. See, e.g.,
Hitchcock, The Supreme Court and Religion: HistoricalOverview and Future Prognosis, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 183, 194-97 (1980); Tushnet, Deviant Science in Constitutional Law, 59 TEX. L. REv. 815, 820 (1981).
177. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1359, 1362 (1984); Wolman
v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (plurality opinion); Committee for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 761 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
Justice Rehnquist finds inadequate the primary judicial test in establishment clause
cases, the test in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614-15 (1971). He argues that
difficulties with the test arise, because it "has no more grounding in the history of the
First Amendment than does the wall theory upon which it rests." Wallace v. Jaffree,
105 S. Ct. 2479, 2158 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
178. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 177.
179. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1359 (1984) (Constitution
"affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance"); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (benevolent neutrality); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (government attitude should not be one of callous indifference to
religious groups).
180. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1360-61 (1984); Committee
for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792 (1973); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
313-14 (1952).
181. The Court has stated that it gives great weight to the historical acceptance
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The structure of the formal tests leaves little room for an articulated consideration of policy concerns. The primary tests that the Court employs were
formulated in Larson v. Valente'8 2 and Lemon v. Kurtzman.18 3 The Court has
employed the Larson test to evaluate legislation that arguably discriminates
against a religious denomination.881 The test requires that the legislation be
justified by a compelling state interest and be closely fitted to further that
interest. 185 This balancing test results in a strong stand against arguably discriminatory legislation; questionable measures face a very difficult task in surviving the test's requirements.1 88 Only that elusive commodity, the compelling
state interest, outweighs competing concerns, and then only if the legislation is
closely fitted to its purpose. The test thus leaves little room for consideration of
religion's secular contribution to exert a significant impact on the decision,
particularly because the consideration would militate against upholding the
challenged legislation, which already bears an enormously heavy burden.
The Court has employed the Lemon test when the challenged legislation
arguably benefits one religion over another or benefits religion over nonreligion. Examples are a publicly funded display of a particular religion's holiday
symbol1 87 or a program of financial assistance to religiously affiliated
schools.1 88 The tests requires that the legislation have a secular purpose and a
principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. It also
requires that the legislation not foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion.18 9 Excessive entanglement may be of the administrative or politiof a particular practice, especially when the acceptance extends back to the Framer's
era. See supra text accompanying notes 123-28. Precisely how this factor is included in
the Court's formal test remains unarticulated.
182. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
183. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Court consistently has emphasized its refusal to
be bound to a single test in all establishment clause cases. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly,
104 S. Ct. 1355, 1362 (1984); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1971). Yet, since 1971, it has employed the Lemon
test in all establishment cases except for Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S.Ct. 3330 (1983),
and Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). In Larson, the Court applied a new test,
but stated that the statute in question also would fail under the Lemon test. Id. at 24755.
184. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246-47, 252 (1982).
185. Id. at 247.
186. See id. at 246.
187. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1362-65 (1984).
188. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). According to
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982), the Lemon test is used to evaluate "laws
affording a uniform benefit to all religions, and not to provisions. . . that discriminate
among religions." Id. (emphasis in original). The Court, however, applied the Lemon
test in Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984), in which the public creche arguably
benefited only the Christian religion. The cases thus seem to distinguish between provisions that arguably discriminate against a religion by imposing a direct burden on it
and provisions that favor a religion by awarding it a direct benefit. Cf. Lynch, 104 S.
Ct. at 1366 n.13 (appearing to accord with my conclusion).
189. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/3
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cal variety. Administrative entanglement is excessive when the government
significantly intrudes into the operation of sectarian institutions. 190 Political
entanglement is excessive when government action has an impermissibly high
potential for political divisiveness along religious lines.19' None of the elements
calls for an express balancing. Religion's secular contribution would seem to
be an appropriate subject for consideration under the test's public purpose
prong. Yet the public purpose analysis usually is perfunctory, since the prong
poses no threat to legislation's
validity except when an illicit purpose is plainly
92
apparent to the Court.
Despite the lack of express balancing, the Lemon test's precise formulation and application varies with the policy judgments of the Court majority. In
the most recent cases, a slim majority of the justices has applied the test with
an increased accommodationist bent. 19 3 The Court also has restated the test so
that it will yield more accommodationist results. It has rejected empirical evidence as proof of illicit effect and thus has seriously weakened the ability to
demonstrate a violation of the secular effect prong.' 9 It also has limited consideration of excessive political entanglement to cases concerning direct financial subsidies to church sponsored schools and other religious institutions. 95
The close votes on these holdings, however, invite speculation on their precedential value. 96
190. Id. at 618-22.
191. Id. at 622-24. The Court has never held that political divisiveness alone can
serve to invalidate otherwise permissible government conduct. See Lynch v. Donnelly,
104 S. Ct. 1355, 1364-65 (1984). It recently has limited consideration of political divisiveness to cases concerning direct subsidies to church-sponsored schools or colleges or
other religious institutions. See id. at 1365; Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 n.11
(1983).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 152-56.

193. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 U.S. 1355, 1370-71 (1984) (Brennan, J., dis-

senting); Mueller v. Allen, 103 U.S. 3062, 3071-78 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The Court, however has not made a radical policy shift. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton,
105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985) (rejecting a program aiding students in religous schools);
Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985) (rejecting two programs
aiding students in religious schools); Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (rejecting statute authorizing silent meditation and prayer in public schools).
194. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 402 (1983). The Court recently fleshed
out the meaning of the effects prong, perhaps to revitalize it. In Grand Rapids School
Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3223-30 (1985), the Court invalidated two programs in
which state employed teachers taught classes in classrooms leased from religious
schools. The Court found an illicit primary effect, because the teachers might subtly or
overtly engage in religious indoctrination; the symbolic union of church and state inherent in the programs might convey a message of state support for religion; and the
programs effectively subsidized the religious mission of the affected institution.
195. See supra note 191.
196. Both the refusal to consider empirical evidence in applying the secular effect prong and the limitation on considering the degree of political entanglement first
arise in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 402, 403 n.11 (1983) (5-4 decision). The Court
reaffirmed the limitation on considering excessive political entanglement in Lynch v.
Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1365 (1984) (5-4 decision).
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Whatever the current majority interpretation, the Lemon test's structure
creates a bias favoring strict separation of church and state. The excessive
entanglement prong most clearly discloses the separatist bias. It can invalidate
government action that offers merely a potential risk of an unacceptably high
degree of government support for religion, religiously based discord, or political divisiveness along religious lines. 197 Certainly some risk is always present.
The Court, however, never has explained how attenuated the risk must be
before it is insufficient to invalidate legislation. 198 The excessive entanglement
prong does not permit articulation of interests that might outweigh the risk.
The Court instead has merely described the risk as sufficient or insufficiently
attenuated to raise a constitutional obstacle. The emphasis on risk, the inevitable presence of some risk, and the lack of criteria for determining when other
concerns outweigh the risk create a bias favoring a finding of unacceptable
risk and hence excessive entanglement.
The secular effect prong shares similar characteristics. As applied, it requires that government action not have the direct and immediate effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.1 99 Though some nonsecular effect probably is
always present in actions that affect religion, the court offers little guidance in
determining how insignificant the nonsecular effect must be for the measure to
be constitutional. The prong does not permit articulation of countervailing interests. The emphasis on nonsecular effect, the inevitability of some nonsecular
197. See, e.g., Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618-21 (1971). Though the Court never has decided a case
solely on grounds of political divisiveness, it has often noted that the potential for political divisiveness has informed its determinations. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 372 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794-97 (1973);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971); L. TRIBE, supra note 4, § 14-12 at
868-69 (1978). A similar bias creating a heightened sensitivity to potentially excessive
entanglement also arises in cases dealing with internal ecclesiastical disputes, though
the cases are decided on free exercise grounds. See Sirico, supra note 171, at 3, 56-64.
For a discussion of the entanglement concept's appearance in recent free exercise cases,
see Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment,
27 UCLA L. REV. 1195, 1210-14 (1980).
198. The Court has offered three criteria for determining whether or not entanglement is excessive: "the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefitted,
the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615
(1971). These criteria are too general to offer much guidance, as the many divided
Court opinions since Lemon illustrate. See Ripple supra note 197, at 1216-18 (by requiring the Court to predict the probability of unconstitutional consequences, the entanglement test greatly increases the degree of judicial subjectivity); Gaffney, Political
Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Courts in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205, 211 (1980) (describing the political divisiveness component of the entanglement test as "not a test at all but a standardless mask disguising the real reasons why federal judges nullify controversial
legislation").
199. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see also L.
TRIBE, supra note 4, § 14-9, at 840.
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effect, and the lack of criteria for determining when other concerns outweigh
any nonsecular effect create a bias favoring a finding of unconstitutional effect. The Court certainly may determine that the effect is not unconstitutional,
just as it can find a lack of excessive entanglement. In doing so, however, it
must overcome the Lemon test's inherent bias.
Despite these observations, my purpose here is not to reformulate the
Court's tests for deciding cases with religious dimensions. Rather, I encourage
greater consideration of religion's secular contribution in deciding these cases.
In cases that use an explicit balancing test, the inclusion of an additional consideration poses no great difficulty. In cases governed by tests that do not permit express balancing, the advocate may only raise the additional consideration and ask that it inform the judicial determination. In the Article's
concluding section, I supplement this brief discussion by applying my argument to an area populated by closely decided cases: state financial aid to
church related schools.
III.

APPLYING THE THESIS: GOVERNMENT AID TO RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
AND COLLEGES

In this section, I begin by restating the Supreme Court case law concerning government financial assistance to religiously affiliated schools and colleges. The discussion is limited to federal Supreme Court decisions. Though
some state courts have reviewed assistance programs under the state and federal constitutions, their analyses raise no additional issues. 00 I then offer an
explanation for the unsatisfactory nature of the Court's analysis and conclude
by describing the type of case in which my thesis might have the greatest
influence.
A.

The State of the Case Law

The following seven paragraphs summarize the Supreme Court holdings
on government assistance to religiously affiliated educational institutions. The
government programs on which the Court has ruled have directed aid either to
nonpublic institutions alone 20 1 or to public and nonpublic institutions concurrently. 202 Challenges have been lodged against parts of the programs that aid
private institutions, because religiously affiliated institutions are included in
their number. In the case of primary and secondary private schools, the bulk
200. See, e.g., California Teachers Assoc. v. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d 794, 632 P.2d 953,
176 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1981); Gaffney v. State Dep't of Educ., 192 Neb. 358, 220
N.W.2d 550 (1974); Dickman v. School Dist., 232 Or. 238, 366 P.2d 533 (1961), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962); Bloom v. School Comm., 376 Mass. 35, 379 N.E.2d 578
(1978); Bowerman v. O'Connor, 104 R.I. 519, 247 A.2d 82 (1968).
201. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782 n.38
(1973).
202. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983).
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of these institutions are religiously affiliated. 20 3 In the following paragraphs,
the phrase "private schools" includes nonpublic primary and secondary schools
when a very significant number of the schools have religious affiliations. The
phrase "private colleges" includes nonpublic colleges and universities, some of
which have religious affiliations.
1. Tax Benefits and Financial Aid to Students
The government may permit parents to take tax deductions for tuition,
textbook, and transportation expenses when the deduction is available for expenses incurred in sending children to either public or private schools.2 0 It
may not permit parents to deduct a designated amount that varies with their
income and the number of enrolled children when the tax benefit is available
to parents only for children in private schools. 20 5 It may not reimburse parents
for tuition they pay to private schools. 20 6 It may fund a program to award
financial aid to public and private college students when the students use the
funds to cover only educationally related expenses. 20 7 It may grant funds to
private colleges to use as scholarship assistance for financially needy students.
These students may use the assistance only for secular educational purposes.
The college must provide reports and certification showing compliance with
208
the limitation on the use of the funds.
2.

Transportation

The government may reimburse parents of public and private school students for the cost of bus transportation to school.2 09 It may not reimburse pri210
vate schools for the cost of bus transportation for field trips.
203. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 234 (1977) (96% of Ohio's
nonpublic schools had religious affiliation); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 610
(1971) (in 1969, 96% of Pennsylvania's nonpublic school students attended schools with
religious affiliations); see also infra text accompanying notes 275, 282-85, 297-99.
204. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, (1983) (5-4 decision).
205. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 790-91 (1973) (6-3
vote on the issue).
206. Id. at 780 (6-3 vote on issue); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 828-33 (1973)
(6-3 decision).
207. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Blanton, 434 U.S.
803, summarily af'g, 433 F. Supp. 97 (M.D. Tenn. 1977) (three justices would have
noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument).
208. Smith v. Board of Governors, 434 U.S. 803, summarily affig, 429 F. Supp.
871 (W.D.N.C. 1977) (three justices would have noted probable jurisdiction and set
the case for oral argument). The limitation on using the funds for only secular educational purposes meant that the funds could not be used to assist students enrolled in a
program designed as preparation for a religious vocation. 429 F. Supp. at 873.
209. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947) (7-2 decision).
210. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 252-55 (1977) (5-4 vote on issue).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/3

38

Sirico: Secular Contribution of Religion to the Political Process:
AMENDMENT AND SCHOOL AID
19851 Sirico:FIRST

3. Instructional Materials
The government may loan secular textbooks to private school students."'
It may not loan instructional materials or educational equipment to private
schools 212 or their students,21 3 even if the materials and equipment are secular,
neutral, and nonideological.
4. Auxiliary Services
The government may provide a program in which state employed professionals perform speech, hearing, and psychological diagnostic services on private school premises." 4 It may provide a program in which state employed
professionals offer therapeutic services, but only if they provide the services off
private school grounds.21 5 The government may not employ teachers to conduct classes in private schools as part of a program to offer remedial classes
and guidance
services to educationally deprived children from low income
21 6
families.
5. Grants to Institutions
The government may not make direct grants to private schools to maintain and repair their facilities. 17 It may provide funds to private colleges to
construct facilities to be used solely for nonreligious purposes, provided that
the limitation on use continues as long as the facility retains any financial
value. 21 8 It also may issue revenue bonds to benefit private colleges to finance
construction of facilities to be used solely for nonreligious purposes when the
colleges repay the bonds from their own revenues.2 19 It also may make annual,
noncategorical grants to private colleges when the government screens each
college to make sure that is it not pervasively religious and when each college
gives adequate assurance that it will use the funds for secular purposes and
220
reports on how it spends the funding.
211. Id. at 236-38 (6-3 vote on issue); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359-62
(1975) (6-3 vote on issue); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238-48 (1968) (6-3

decision).
212.

Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362-66 (1975) (6-3 vote on issue).

213. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248-51 (1977) (6-3 vote on issue).
214. Id. at 241-44 (8-1 vote on issue).
215. Id. at 244-48 (7-2 vote on issue); see also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,
367-72 (1975) (6-3 vote on issue) (rejecting on premises therapeutic services).
216. Aquilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985)
217. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774 (1973) (8-1 vote
on issue).
218. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (5-4 decision).
219. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 736-49 (1973) (6-3 decision).
220. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 754-67 (1976) (5-4 decision). Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), permits government to grant a property tax exemption to religious educational institutions as part of a general exemption
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6.

Salaries

The government may not pay a supplement to the salaries of private
school teachers, even under the guise of purchasing specified educational services. 221 The government may not pay the salaries of government
employed
222
teachers and assign them to teach classes in private schools.
7.

Testing

The government may reimburse private schools for the cost of administering and grading standardized achievement tests when the tests are prepared by
public officials, 223 even when the tests include some essay questions. 224 It may
not reimburse a private school for the costs of state mandated testing when the
private school prepares the tests.225 It may reimburse private schools for the
cost of keeping attendance and other government-required records when legislation imposes auditing safeguards to insure that reimbursements cover only
220
the cost of this activity.
B.

The Lack of a Satisfactory Judicial Analysis

The lack of apparent consistency in these holdings has become a commonplace observation. 227 The holdings on loans of instructional material and provision of auxiliary services illustrate the unsatisfactory nature of the judicial
analysis. The government, for example, may loan secular textbooks to students
for nonprofit institutions. A private school or college may not enjoy an exemption from
federal taxation when its admissions policy includes racial discrimination and justifies
the discrimination as a mandate of religious doctrine. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983).
221.

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-25 (1971) (8-0 decision concerning

Pennsylvania statute; 8-1 decision concerning Rhode Island statute).
222. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985).
223. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 238-41 (1977) (6-3 vote on issue).
224. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 656 (1980) (5-4
decision).
225. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1973) (8-1
decision).
226. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 656 (1980) (5-4 decision). See Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1973) (8-1 decision) (invalidating lump sum per pupil payment that was designed as a
reimbursement).
227. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2518-20 (1985) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); G.

GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 1567-

69 (10th ed. 1980); Kurland, The Relevance of the Constitution:The Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 21-23 (1978);

Ripple, supra note 197, at 1216-18; Note, Rebuilding the Wall: The Casefor a Return
to the Strict Interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1463,
1463-73 (1981); Note, State Aid to ParochialSchools: A Quantitative Analysis, 71
GEO. L.J. 1063, 1064-74 (1983).
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in religious schools, 228 but it may not loan secular, neutral instructional materials or equipment to the students, 229 their parents,2 30 or the schools themselves. 31 According to the Court, the textbook loan is valid, because the financial benefit runs to the parents and children.23 2 The loan of materials, however,
has the unconstitutional primary effect of advancing religion, because it benefits schools of a predominantly religious character. 233 The Court has determined that textbooks enjoy a unique presumption of neutrality and has ex23
pressly chosen not to extend the presumption to similar teaching materials. 4
According to the Court, the government may provide speech, hearing, and
psychological diagnostic services on school premises, 235 but it may not provide
services to remedy the diagnosed difficulties on school premises. 236 The Court
has declared that diagnostic services have little or no educational content and
require only limited contact with the child.237 It therefore has reasoned that
these factors reduce pressure on the diagnostician to allow instrusion of sectarian views and that diagnosis offers limited opportunity for transmission of
such views. 238 In contrast, according to the Court, the therapist operating on
school grounds might depart from religious neutrality. In the Court's words,
he or she would be "performing important educational services in schools in
which education is an integral part of the dominant sectarian mission and in
which an atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of religious belief is constantly maintained. ' 239 Yet the Court has permitted provision of therapeutic
services at religiously neutral locations that serve only sectarian pupils, because the locations lack the environmental pressures that might subvert the
therapist's task to the service of religion. 240 Though the Court's analyses in
these examples fall within the realm of customary judicial argumentation, the
highly refined nature of the distinctions suggests a thinness to the Court's reaunpersuasive and
soning. The Court's critics frequently find the distinctions
241
therefore conclude that the holdings are inconsistent.
The decisions have failed to conform to any theory seeking to furnish a
principled analysis. The child benefit theory, for example, would permit finan228. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236-38 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 359-62 (1975); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238-48 (1968).
229. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248-51 (1977).

230. Id.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362-66 (1975).
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968).
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363-66 (1975).
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 251 n.18 (1977).
Id. at 241-44.
Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,

367-72 (1975).
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244 (1977).
Id.
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 371 (1975).
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 247 (1977).
See supra note 227.
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cial benefits to parents and children, but not to religious educational institutions.242 Even if such a distinction were possible, it would not reconcile the
Court's holdings permitting the state to loan secular textbooks, but not instructional materials, to parents and children, for example. In rejecting the
loan of instructional materials, the Court declared that to approve such loans
to parents and children, but not to schools "would exalt form over substance"
and noted the impossibility of separating the secular education function from
the sectarian function. 24 3 In this instance, the distinction between child benefit
and institutional benefit seems impossible to make.
Another theory would approve services that are furnished off school premises, but not services furnished on them. The Court, nonetheless, has upheld
diagnostic services furnished on school premises. 24 4 A pragmatic approach
would have the cases turn on the relative amount of financial aid that the state
disburses to religious educational institutions. 24 51 The Court has suggested that
the amount of aid is a significant factor in determining whether an assistance
program impermissibly advances religion. 246 The Court, however, has upheld
programs allocating substantial aid to religious schools;24 7 in some instances, it
has upheld programs offering greater aid
to religious institutions than was of24 81
fered in programs that it has rejected.
The Court's only consistent pattern has been to permit aid to religiously
affiliated colleges and universities in virtually every instance and to permit aid
to religiously affiliated primary and secondary schools in only some instances.
It has invalidated a college aid provision only once.24 In Tilton v. Richardson,
the Court upheld federal construction grants for college buildings to be used
242. For discussions of the child benefit theory, see, e.g., California Teachers
Ass'n v Riles, 29 Cal. 3d 794, 807-11, 632 P.2d 953, 960-64, 176 Cal. Rptr. 300, 30710 (1981); Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to ParochialSchools, 56 CALIF. L, REV. 260, 313-18 (1968).
243. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977).
244. Id. at 241-44.
245. See Note, State Aid to ParochialSchools, supra note 227.
246. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 (1975); Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229, 256 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
247. See, e.g., Committee for Public Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 665 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (upholding program allocating most of an eight to ten million dollar appropriation to religious schools); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 233
(1977) (upholding most of a program appropriating most of eighty-eight million, eight
hundred thousand dollars biennially to religious schools).
248. For example, in Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 474
(1973), the Court struck down a twenty-eight million dollar assistance program, most
of which would have aided religious schools. In Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 233
(1977), the Court upheld most of an assistance program that carried a biennial appropriation of eighty-eight million, eight hundred thousand dollars, most of which would
have gone to religious schools. See Note, Rebuilding the Wall, supra note 227, at
1469-70 (suggesting that construction grants permitted in Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971), provide greater financial benefits than the maintenance and repair
funding rejected in Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 418 U.S. 756 (1973)).
249. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 682-83 (1971).
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solely for secular purposes.2 50 Under the program, the government could demand return of grant money if a college were to use a building for religious
purposes. The Court invalidated a statutory provision prohibiting the governyears, even if the
ment from demanding return of grant money after twenty
251
college then used the building for religious purposes.
The explanation for the judicial pattern lies in the way the Court has
categorized educational institutions. In its opinions, the Court always has
found that the particular colleges and universities receiving aid were not pervasively religious.2 52 In contrast, it always has assumed that primary and secondary sectarian schools were pervasively religious.2 53 It also has noted that
the impressionable ages of pupils in the latter institutions enhance the process
of religious indoctrination, while the skepticism of college students limits the
effectiveness of sectarian influences. 254 Though advocates sometimes have argued that a particular school is not pervasively religious or that a particular
college is, the Court has uniformly adhered to its stereotypes. Even if the judicial stereotyping explains the college aid cases, it still fails to shed light on the
primary and secondary school aid cases.
The inadequacies of the Court's opinions yield dual practical consequences. First, the cases offer no analysis that permits accurate predictions on
the results of subsequent cases. Second, comparing the fact patterns of prior
cases and new cases also offers limited predictive assistance. The distinction
between textbooks and other instructional materials, for example, proved to be
a pivotal factual distinction to determine the constitutionality of an aid program, 255 as did the distinction between diagnostic and therapeutic services. 258
The problem lies not with a judicial failure properly to apply a clear constitutional directive or even to apply some proposed rule that would represent a
judicially acceptable interpretation of the Constitution. Neither clear constitutional directive or any proposed rule exists that would attract a broad judicial
or scholarly consensus. The problem is symptomatic of national disagreement
over the proper relationship of church and state.
The text of the establishment clause furnishes no clear guidance in deciding specific cases. A prohibition on establishing religion, originally intended to
forbid establishment of a national church, 257 offers no help in determining the
250. Id. at 677-82, 684-89.
251. Id. at 682-83.
252. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755-59, 764-65 (1976);
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742-44 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,

684-87 (1971).
253. See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3223 (1985);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 235 n.4 (1977); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
615-18 (1971). For a discussion on the Court's use of standardized institutional
profiles, see Ripple supra note 197, at 1221-24.

254. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 228-34.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 235-40.
257. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985

43

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 3

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

constitutionality of a particular type of government assistance to a religious
school. The principle that today's Court derives from the establishment clause
is separation of church and state. 25 8 Though the principle enjoys general acceptance, Court members invoke it to justify very different conclusions in a
given case.
Operative rules for implementing this principle, for example, the Lemon
test,259 naturally reflect the disagreement over the separation principle's meaning and therefore fail to yield predictable results. For example, when the
Court applies the Lemon test to a particular set of facts, any difference between the facts and the facts of a prior case requires the Court to determine if
the difference is material to the new case's outcome. For example, the Court
must decide whether the difference between textbooks and other instructional
items is material or whether the difference between diagnostic and therapeutic
services is material. To make the determination on materiality, the Court must
apply the ambiguous separation principle. Variations in the facts-the meat2 of
60
most litigation-thus require a return to basic, but indeterminate principles.
The Constitution's text, the separation principle, and the Lemon test,. then, fail
to furnish predictable judicial results in educational aid cases.
The indeterminacy of legal principles and operative rules perhaps characterizes all fields of law. Here, however, the steady stream of fragmented decisions and the visibility of the substantive issue makes the indeterminacy particularly apparent. The problem's resolution does not lie with finding a new
test that both possesses greater predictive ability and reflects a consensus of
the establishment clause's meaning as applied to the educational aid cases.
Though a new test might possess greater predictive ability, it could not attract
the necessary consensus.
Any test with greater predictive ability gains this quality by incorporating
a strong bias for or against educational aid. For example, one proposed test
would uphold government assistance to church affiliated schools so long as the
amount does not exceed the value of the secular educational service that the
schools provide. 26 1 This test springs from the accommodationist principle that
the establishment clause should forbid only government action whose purpose
is solely religious and that is likely to impair religious freedom by coercing,
compromising, or influencing religious beliefs. 26 2 The test thus would offer con258. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1358-59 (1984).
259. "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ;
finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see supra text accompanying
notes 187-99.
260. For a more elaborate discussion of these problems in another context, see
Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REv. 473, 527-43 (1984).
261. See Choper, supra note 242, at 265-66, 283-311.
262. See Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling
the Conflict, 41 U. PIr. L. REv. 673, 675 (1980).
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siderable predictability, but would be unacceptable to many because of its accommodationist bias. In contrast, Justice Brennan has proposed a test that
would forbid "those involvements of religion with secular institutions that...
serve the essentially religious activities of religious institutions;. . . employ the
organs of government for essentially religious purposes;

. . .

or use essentially

religious means to serve governmental ends, where secular means would suffice. ' ' 2 63 This test also would offer considerable predictability, because it likely
would invalidate virtually all educational aid programs. It has failed to gain
adoption, presumably because it reflects Justice Brennan's severely separatist
position. A decision to adopt a more predictive test than the Lemon test thus
would require a consensus to adopt a more definite policy for or against educational aid.

26

4

Supreme Court decisions, however, indicate a decided lack of consensus
and an inability to adopt a new policy except by a close, transitory majority
vote. A statistical analysis of the decisions and a reading of the opinions disclose that the justices divide into three highly cohesive blocs.2 65 Justices Bur-

263. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-95 (1963).
264. In addition to the fundamental policy considerations, an additional judicial
concern must be with a state legislature enacting a statute that attempts to grant aid
by slightly revising a statute that the Court already has invalidated. At the same time,
legislatures also must face frustration when the Court rejects legislation that seems to
conform with prior judicial statements. One authority has described the process as an
"historic game of chess." Young, Constitutional Validity of State Aid to Pupils in
Church-Related Schools-Internal Tension Between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 783, 787 (1977) (quoting Leo Pfeffer).
Tracing the history of legislative efforts in a given state illustrates the process. In
1971, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, struck down a Pennsylvania statute that
authorized direct payments to nonpublic schools. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 5601-09
(Purdon 1970) (repealed 1977). The legislature then authorized a program to reimburse parents for school tuition. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 5701-09 (Purdon Supp.
1984). Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973), invalidated this program. In 1972, the
legislature authorized a program providing on-site auxiliary services, loans of instructional materials and equipment to nonpublic schools, and a textbook loan program
modeled after the program upheld in Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 9-972 (Purdon Supp. 1984). Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975), rejected all but the textbook loan program. In 1980, the legislature enacted
a program that provides auxiliary services in a manner almost identical to the manner
upheld in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 241-48 (1977). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24
§ 9-972.1 (Purdon Supp. 1984). For a brief summary of a similar process in Ohio, see
Kancelbaum, Shifting Currents in the Narrow Channel of State Aid to Parochial
Schools, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 757, 768 (1977).
265. For a detailed statistical analysis of the Court's voting blocs, see Peterson,
The Thwarted Opportunity for Judicial Activism in Church-StateRelations: Separation and Accommodation in PrecariousBalance, 22 J. CHURCH & STATE 435, 442-57
(1980); see also G. GUNTHER, supra note 227, at 1568; Young, supra note 264, at 788,
and accompanying notes. The most recent school cases indicate a continuing lack of
consensus. See Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985); Grand Rapids School Dist. v.
Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985). The outcomes of the cases are consistent with the outcomes of prior cases. Because Justice Brennan authored the majority opinions, they
emphasize policy themes that separatists emphasize.
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ger, White, Rehnquist, and apparently O'Connor" 6 have comprised the accommodationist bloc and almost consistently have voted to uphold educational
aid programs. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and former Justice Douglas have comprised the separatist bloc. Justices Blackmun, Powell, and former
Justice Stewart have served as the middle bloc, whose swing votes frequently
have determined case outcomes. In recent opinions, Justice Blackmun has
seemed to lean more toward the separatist bloc.2 67 Supreme Court decisions,
then, fail to demonstrate a policy consensus on the issues. They demonstrate
only that a majority of justices decided to vote for a given result for a variety
of reasons. A change in Court personnel easily could lead to changes in the
results of cases already decided.
In sum, even if a new test were to gain adoption, it would join the Lemon
test in failing to produce an analytic consensus unless the Court bench were to
acquire a more homogeneous character. If the Court were to achieve homogeneity, it would fail to reflect the diversity of opinion in American society. In a
recent school aid case, Justice White identified the problem:
This is not to say that this case, any more than past cases, will furnish a
litmus-paper test to distinguish permissible from impermissible aid to religiously oriented schools. But Establishment Clause cases are not easy; they stir
deep feelings; and we are divided among ourselves, perhaps reflecting the different views on this subject of the people of this country. What is certain is
that our decisions have tended to avoid categorical imperatives and absolutist
approaches at either end of the range of possible outcomes. This course sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility, but this promises to be the case
until the continuing interaction between the courts and the States-the former charged with interpreting and upholding the Constitution and the latter
seeking to provide education for their youth-produces
a single, more encom2 68
passing construction of the Establishment Clause.
266. Justice O'Connor dissented in Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3243
(1985), and concurred in part and dissented in part in Grand Rapids School Dist. v.
Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3231 (1985). She joined the majority in Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388 (1983). An accommodationist philosophy is also indicated by her votes in
Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983), and Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355,
1366 (1984) (concurring opinion), in which she proposed an accommodationist interpretation of the Lemon test. An accommodationist theme runs through her concurring
opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2496 (1985).
267. Justice Blackmun joined the majority in both Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct.
3232 (1985), and Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985). He
joined the dissent in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), and wrote a strong dissent
in Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
268. .Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980). The extensive litigation over government aid to church schools sharply contrasts with the paucity
of challenges-much less successful challenge-to government funding of church-run
social service programs. To argue that the latter relationships are easily structured to
insure church-state neutrality while the former freqently are not poses a highly debatable proposition. Social programs that serve the young and the infirm would seem to
harbor a serious potential for undue religious influence over the clientele.
The reason for the virtual immunity of the social programs from constitutional
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To assist the judiciary in deciding these cases, scholars and other thoughtful advocates may assume one of three roles. First, they may seek to amend or
reformulate the current operative test so that it more precisely implements the
test's underlying principle. The judiciary's philosophical disarray, however,
suggests that the effort would prove unproductive.
Second, advocates may propose a new or amended test with the understanding that they really are arguing for a stronger position favoring or opposing educational aid programs. For example, the test permitting aid not in excess of the value of a school's secular educational service offers an
2 70
accommodationist test.26 Justice Brennan's proposal offers a separatist test.
Another example is the current Court majority's reformulation of Lemon's primary effect test to exclude statistical evidence.2 7 By eliminating a previously
powerful tool for challenging aid programs, the Court has shifted to a more
2 72
accommodationist approach.
Third, advocates may introduce factual information or policy designed to
influence judicial decisions. This effort seeks to bolster the positions of judges
sympathetic to the advocate's position by furnishing persuasive information or
increasing the emphasis that an existing consideration receives. It also seeks to
encourage other judges to change their positions at least incrementally as they
decide a given case. In this latter effort, the primary audience consists of
judges who are neither resolutely separatist nor accommodationist.
My efforts fall into the third category. Rather than arguing for a revision
or replacement of the Lemon test, I seek to influence the way courts apply the
test to close cases, that is, cases in which judicial policy preferences do not
already dictate the outcomes. By directing attention to religion's secular contribution, I seek to exert a modest influence on how courts interpret the basic
constitutional principle and apply it to specific disputes.
C. The Impact of the Thesis
Whether increased attention to religion's secular contribution would exert
attack may stem from an historical acceptance of the church-state partnership in the
welfare field and from the lack of a challenge from supporters of government programs
who might see the church programs as a drain on their funding. My point is that
judicial decisionmaking in religion cases encompasses far more than technical legal

analysis. For further discussion of the constitutionality of government funding for

church-run social programs, see Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and
Doctrinal Development: Part IL The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REv.
513, 554-60 (1968); Pickrell & Horwich, Religion as an Engine of Civil Policy: A
Comment of the FirstAmendment Limitations on the Church-State Partnershipin the
Social Welfare Field, 44 L. & CONTENIP. PROB. 111 (1981).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 261-62.
270. See supra text accompanying note 262.
271. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983).
272. See id. at 408-11 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); The Supreme Court,
1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 154-55 (1983). But see supra notes 193 & 194.
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a significant impact on the educational aid cases is difficult to predict in light
of the judicial unpredictability in this area. An impact, however, is possible.
The Court decisions are products of slim majorities and usually are determined by swing voters. 27 3 Attaching increased weight to a relevant consideration could affect critical votes. In two particular instances, increased emphasis
on religion's secular contribution could be decisive: the especially close case
and the case with facts that make my argument especially relevant. These
instances now receive attention.
1. The Particularly Close Case
Though virtually all the educational aid cases are close ones, some are
particularly close. To determine whether a case falls in the latter category
requires looking not merely at the closeness of the judicial vote, but also at the
judicial analysis, at the votes of specific justices, and at other circumstances.
Cases ruling on attempts to give aid through tax statutes offer an illustration.
I develop the illustration to demonstrate what makes a case a particularly
close one.
The relevant Supreme Court cases are Committee for Public Education
and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist 7 4 and Mueller v. Allen 75. In Nyquist, the
Court invalidated a New York statute granting benefits to parents of children
attending nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. Under the statute, a
parent with an annual taxable income of less than five thousand dollars was
eligible for a partial reimbursement for tuition. A parent in a higher income
bracket could receive a state tax deduction of a designated amount that varied
with adjusted gross income and the number of children enrolled, but that did
not vary with the amount of tuition actually paid.27 6 Approximately
eight-five
2 77
percent of the nonpublic schools in the state were church-related.
The Nyquist Court applied the Lemon test and found that the scheme
had the impermissible effect of advancing religion. In an opinion by Justice
Powell, six justices agreed that, in effect, the legislation provided financial support to sectarian schools with no means of guaranteeing that the aid would be
used exclusively for secular purposes. 27 8 The majority thus found the program
indistinguishable from a program of general grants awarded directly to the
schools. 2 7 9 The majority recognized the validity of the state legislature's secular interest in promoting pluralism and diversity among the state's public and
273. See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
274. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
275. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
276. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 764-67 (1973).
277. Id. at 768. Seven hundred thousand to eight hundred thousand students,
almost 20% of the State's entire elementary and secondary school population attended
over two thousand nonpublic schools. Id.
278. Id. at 780-94.
279. Id. at 780.
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nonpublic schools and its interest in maintaining a school system that reduces
the burden on public schools.280 It nonetheless concluded that proper legislative purpose and secular benefits do not immunize legislation from further
scrutiny under the Lemon test.28
In Mueller v. Allen28 2 the Court upheld a Minnesota statute that permitted state income taxpayers to deduct expenses for tuition, textbooks, instructional materials, and transportation for dependents in public and nonpublic
secondary and elementary schools. By a five to four vote, the Court held that
the statute passed muster under the Lemon test. Writing for the majority,
Justice Rehnquist found that the statute had a valid public purpose, because2 8it3
reduced the burden on public schools and provided them with a benchmark.
The statute's challengers argued that the statute had an unconstitutional primary effect. They noted that the major deduction would be for tuition and
therefore primarily would benefit parents of nonpublic school children, ninetysix percent of whom attended religiously affiliated schools. 2 4 The majority,
however, rejected determining the statute's primary effect on statistical evidence and instead relied on the statute's facial neutrality to find a permissible
effect. 28 5 It found a neutral effect, because the deductions were available to
parents of both public and nonpublic school children.2 8 The Court also found
no excessive administrative entanglement of church and state.28 7 In addition, it
declared that the part of the entanglement test concerning divisive political
potential applies only when the government pays direct financial subsidies to
28
religious schools or their teachers.
The Mueller Court failed to overturn any prior holdings in the area and
took pains to distinguish the Mueller statute from the Nyquist statute. The
Court found two major distinctions. First, the Court stated that the Nyquist
statute conferred "thinly disguised 'tax benefits,' actually amounting to tuition
280. Id. at 795.
281. Id. at 783 & n.39. This holding does not reject my argument. I do not argue
that a secular purpose and a secular contribution should dispense with the need to
apply the remainder of the Lemon test. I argue that the presence of a secular contribution should influence the Court's determinations under the Lemon test. In the close
cases, this influence may determine a case's outcome.
282. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
283. Id. at 395.
284. Id. at 401.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 397, 402. The Court stated that any inequality of effect favoring religious school parents over public school parents could be justified as a rough return to
the religious school parents for the benefits they provide to the state by sending their
children to religious schools-supporting schools that offer wholesome competition to
public schools and reducing the financial cost of operating public schools. Id. at 402.
287. Id. at 403.
288. Id. at 403 n.11. The Court raised the issue on its own. None of the statute's
challengers had argued that it ran afoul of the political divisiveness part of the entanglement test. Id..
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985

49

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 3

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

grants, to the parents and children attending private schools."'28 It noted that
the grants to low income parents did not take the form of ordinary tax benefits
and that the amount of the deduction given to middle income parents was
unrelated to the actual amount they expended on tuition. 290 The Court described the Mueller deduction as a genuine tax deduction and therefore accorded deference to the state legislature's judgment in granting it.291 It explained that it traditionally has recognized that legislatures enjoy great
latitude in making classifications and distinctions in tax statutes, because legislators, familiar with local conditions, possess a special ability to distribute the
tax burden equitably. 292 The Court admitted that the economic consequences
of the Nyquist and Mueller statute might be difficult to distinguish, but argued that "the form of the state's assistance to parochial schools must be examined for the light that it casts on the substance. ' 293 The Court did not
elaborate.
Second, the Court noted that the Mueller deduction is available to parents with children in public schools as well as nonpublic schools. 294 In contrast,
the Nyquist statute benefited only parents of children in nonpublic schools.
The Court held29 5that state assistance to so broad a range of citizens indicates a
secular effect.
In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the Mueller deduction has
the unconstitutional effect of advancing religion.298 According to Marshall, it
ultimately confers a benefit on religious schools without restricting the benefit
to the school's secular function. 297 He rejected the majority's arguments that
distinguished the Nyquist statute. Marshall found no relevance to the distinction between Mueller's genuine tax deduction for tuition and Nyquist's tax
benefits for tuition. He argued that both schemes have the same economic
effect: aiding parents is the equivalent298of aiding schools without restricting the
aid to the schools' secular functions.
Marshall also rejected the majority's argument based on the availability
of the Mueller deduction to all parents of school children. He argued that the
statute's primary benefit is the tuition deduction, and public school parents
would not enjoy its benefits.29 9 Though public school parents could claim deductions for other expenses, Marshall characterized these benefits as de
minimis. 00 He noted, moreover, that ninety-six percent of the taxpayers eligi289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

394.
396 n.6.
396.
397 n.6 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
397.

295. Id.

296. Id. at 405.
297. Id. at 406-07.
298. Id.

299. Id. at 408-11.
300. Id. at 409.
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ble for the tuition deduction send their children to religious schools."°
Marshall would have invalidated deductions for the cost of textbooks and
other instructional materials;30 2 he also strongly questioned the persuasiveness
of prior case law permitting the state to loan secular textbooks to students in
religious schools.30 3 He nonetheless would permit a deduction for the cost of
travel between home and school apparently because of transportation's secular
nature.3 o4
Reasonable justices could differ over the validity of the Mueller majority's two distinctions between the Mueller and Nyquist statutes. The Court
failed to explain its distinction between a genuine tax adjustment and a benefit
masquerading as a genuine tax adjustment. Any legitimate tax provision benefits certain categories of taxpayers. The Court was not persuasive in rejecting
the Nyquist statute on the ground that its benefits were not precisely related
to the parental expenditure in each case. 05 The benefit's size varied according
to the taxpayer's income and number of children enrolled-hardly arbitrary
criteria. The Court cited no precedent requiring that the size of a deduction or
credit be tied to tie size of the expenditure. A graduated income tax system,
for example, makes the tax benefit of identically sized deductions vary with
the taxpayer's income. The Nyquist Court feared that a state could employ
tax legislation as a subterfuge to indirectly subsidize religious schools. 0 ' Both
the Nyquist and Mueller Courts failed to furnish any clear criteria for distinguishing illegitimate government assistance from legitimate tax adjustments.
The Mueller dissent, however, failed to explain why the Nyquist tax benefits and the Mueller tax deduction are indistinguishable. It instead declared
that whatever distinction might be made, such indirect aid to religious schools
is unconstitutional unless government restricts the aid to assisting only the
schools' secular function.3 0 7 Reasonable justices, however, might disagree with
the refusal to distinguish between a tax deduction to an individual and an
unrestricted grant to a religious school. They might decide that the tax benefits religious schools in too attenuated a fashion to classify it as equivalent to a
direct grant to a school.3 8
Reasonable justices also could disagree over the majority's distinction
based on the breadth of the class of taxpayers benefited. The Mueller deduction is available to parents of children in both public and nonpublic schools,
while the Nyquist benefits accrued only to parents with children in nonpublic
schools. The Mueller dissent, however, looked beyond the Mueller statute's
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
(1973).
307.
308.

Id.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 415 n.6. The dissent's reasoning is not precisely articulated.
See id. at 396 n.6; id. at 411-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783-87, 789-91
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 411-13 (1983).
See id. at 400.
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facial neutrality and pointed out that ninety-six percent of all taxpayers eligible for the tuition deduction send their children to religious schools. 30 9 As for
other deductible expenses, for example, expenses for gym clothes, pencils, and
notebooks, which apply to the broad base of public school and nonpublic
school parents, the dissent dismissed these benefits as de minimis. 310 It thus
skirted the difficult task of judging the constitutionality of the benefit when a
broad based group receives some benefit and a decidedly smaller subgroup
receives most of the benefit. 311
The dissent, moreover, failed to acknowledge the high degree of judicial
deference that the tax provisions enjoy. 312 Deference to legislative classifications and distinctions in tax statutes could have overcome the dissent's concern
with the breadth of the benefited class.
As this discussion demonstrates, neither side offers a conclusively persuasive argument. From the perspective of legal analysis, tax benefit cases are
close ones. The split votes by the Court also evidence the closeness of the
cases. Further evidence comes from a look at the votes of the individual justices. Justice Powell, author of the Nyquist majority opinion, was the single
swing vote that determined which side would comprise the majority in Mueller.3 13 As we have seen, the Mueller majority took special care not to question
the Nyquist holding.
The unpredictability in this area is further illustrated by the controversy
over the proposal for a federal tuition tax credit.3 4 Though the proposal has
taken various forms, in essence it would grant a federal income tax credit for a
portion of the tuition expenses that an individual pays for dependents in private primary and secondary schools. 31 5 Neither Mueller nor Nyquist permits a
safe prediction on how the Court would evaluate the tax credit's
constitutionality.
As with the Mueller statute, the tax credit likely would be recognized as
a genuine tax adjustment and not as a subsidy masquerading as a tax adjustment. The Supreme Court never has held a federal income tax statute to be
309. Id. at 409.
310.

Id.

311.
312.

See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 291-92.

313.

In Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), Justice Pow-

ell's opinion spoke for Justices Douglas, Marshall, Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun.
Justices Burger, Rehnquist, and White concurred in part and dissented in part. The

latter three justices would have upheld the tuition reimbursement and tax benefit program. In Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1984), Justices Rehnquist, Burger, White,

Powell, and O'Connor comprised the majority, and Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens comprised the dissent.
314. For discussions of the proposal, see, e.g., Henzke, The Constitutionalityof
Federal Tuition Tax Credits, 56 TEMPLE L.Q. 911 (1983); Tuition Tax Credits, CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST, Jan. 1984, at 3; Note, Mueller v. Allen: A Constitutional Crosswalk to Federal Tuition Tax Credits, 11 J. LEGIS. 163 (1984).
315. See, e.g., Tuition Tax Credits, supra note 314, at 3, 6, 8.
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unconstitutional on its face 16 and recently has described Congressional tax
powers as "virtually without limitation." 317 Whether this traditional deference
would sway the Mueller dissenters remains to be seen.
The tax credit differs from the Mueller deduction in that it would benefit
only individuals with dependents in private schools. The class of beneficiaries
would be similar to the class in Nyquist, as opposed to the broad class in
Mueller. Approximately eleven percent of the nation's primary and secondary
students attend nonpublic schools, and approximately eighty-four percent of
the nonpublic schools have a religious affiliation.318
Thus, of the two grounds that the Mueller majority used to distinguish
the Nyquist tax benefit, one ground-the genuineness of the benefit as a tax
adjustment-favors finding the tax credit to be constitutional, and the other
ground-the breadth of the benefited class-disfavors finding it constitutional.
The Court, of course, might also decide to make a critical metaphysical distinction between a tax deduction and a tax credit. 1" Given the closeness of the
case, an increased attention to the policy consideration for which I argue easily could tip the judicial scales.
2. The Particularly Relevant Fact Pattern
The educational assistance cases have fact patterns that make consideration of religion's secular contribution particularly persuasive. The cases deal
with programs that aid a substantial number of schools and colleges. As the
Court has recognized, these institutions reduce the state's financial obligations,
increase educational diversity, and encourage excellence in their public counterparts. 20 They also make the contribution on which my thesis focuses. Religious schools and colleges provide a value oriented education that assists in
developing civic virtue. Some values with a religious foundation promote ideals
and conduct that are beneficial from a secular perspective. These institutions
train members of society to act virtuously and to demand virtue of public officials. Religion's secular contribution, then, is sufficiently visible in religious
educational endeavors to make it an influential consideration in determining
the constitutionality of educational assistance measures.
A further refinement of the argument is possible. My argument is conceivably more relevant and persuasive in some educational assistance cases
than in others. Some might argue that religious primary and secondary schools
316. See Henzke, supra note 314, at 914.

317. United States v. Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. 2239, 2242 (1983) (upholding exemptions from Windfall Profits Tax).
318. See Tuition Tax Credits, supra note 314, at 5 (U.S. Dept. of Labor statistics for Fall, 1980).
319. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S 388, 411-13(1983) (rejecting the distinction
as formalistic and as not reflecting the reality that both can have the same economic
consequences).

320. See supra text accompanying notes 161-64.
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make a greater secular contribution that do religious colleges and universities.
I would reject this position, because an equally persuasive position might hold
that the colleges and universities make the greater contribution.
The argument favoring colleges and universities would note that these institutions train a select pool of students that will supply a significant number
of public officials and citizens influential in public affairs. As centers of advanced learning, the institutions offer education directly related to government
and public affairs. As centers of scholarship, their academic work may influence public opinion and public decisionmakers. Because colleges and universities are less explicitly religious and more committed to academic freedom than
their primary and secondary school counterparts, their skeptical students and
other audiences may attribute greater credibility to their teaching and scholarship. In contrast, religious primary and secondary schools would be viewed as
exerting a far less direct influence on public affairs because they teach younger
students and provide them with a less critical analysis of the educational subject matter.
The argument favoring primary and secondary schools would emphasize
that they are pervasively religious and value oriented. Therefore, the argument
would go, these institutions exert a very strong influence on young citizens in
their formative years. Because the education is of a general sort, it usually
deals less pointedly with specific political issues and therefore is less likely to
encourage political division along religious lines than is the education furnished by institutions of higher learning. Therefore, support for the argument
might come from those concerned with excessive entanglement of church and
state.
Reasonable judges could disagree over which set of arguments is stronger.
I would vote for the arguments favoring religious colleges and universities,
because the teaching and scholarship are more directly concerned with public
affairs and the public aspect of living a fulfilling life. Nonetheless, I can accept
the conclusion of others that the pervasively religious, value oriented education
at the lower levels ultimately proves more influential. Neither set of arguments
is conclusively the more persuasive. Both types of institutions make a secular
contribution in a different way. To declare one contribution greater than the
other is to engage in an overly refined, speculative analysis. Both sets of arguments, moreover, derive from a stereotypical characterization of the respective
institutions that harmonizes with the stereotypes on which the Supreme Court
relies. 321 The stereotypes certainly are inaccurate as applied to some institutions and perhaps substantially inaccurate as general propositions. I therefore
would make my argument on religion's secular contribution equally applicable
to religious schools, colleges, and universities.
To offer a contrast, I would not find my argument particularly persuasive
in deciding a case concerning a government sponsored display of a nativity
321.

See supra text accompanying notes 252-54.
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scene.3 22 The display might generate some feelings of good fellowship and generosity that ultimately translate into good citizenship. This effect, however,
would seem extremely less significant 2 ' than the secular contribution of religious schools, colleges and universities.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In some of the early establishment clause cases, judicial rhetoric about
the dangers of close church-state relations assumed the tone of purple prose.
For example, Justice Black wrote: "Colonial history had already shown that
here, as elsewhere, zealous sectarians entrusted with government power to further their causes would sometimes torture, maine, and kill those they branded
'heretics,' 'atheists,' or 'agnostics.' ",324 The rhetoric extended to specific religions. In one case, Justice Douglas quoted a prominent anti-Catholic book:
In the parochial schools, Roman Catholic indoctrination is included in every
subject ....

Their purpose is not so much to educate, but to indoctrinate

and train, not to teach Scripture truths and Americanism, but to make loyal
Roman Catholics. The children3 2 5are regimented, and are told what to wear,
what to do, and what to think.

Justice Jackson wrote: "Our public school, if not a product of Protestantism, is
at least more consistent with it than with the Catholic culture and scheme of
values."3 26 Such statements could not help but affect the development of con3
stitutional doctrine.

27

More recently, the Supreme Court has suggested that the old era has
come to an end. The Mueller v. Allen majority has quoted Justice Powell's
observation:
At this point in the 20th century, we are quite far removed from the dangers
that prompted the Framers to include the Establishment Clause in the Bill of
Rights. The risk of significant religious or denominational control over our
democratic processes-or even of deep political divisions along religious
8
lines-is remote ....
322. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
323. See supra note 132.
324. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 318-19 (Black, J., dissenting); see supra
note 176.
325. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 635 n.2 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring), quoting L. BOETTNER, ROMAN CATHOLIcIsM 360 (1962). The seventh circuit
repeated the quote in Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1122 n.12 (7th Cir.
1977), afid, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). See Laycock, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 54
CH.-KENT L. REV. 390, 418-21 (1977). Justice Douglas also characterized other religions in unflattering terms. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 246 n.5 (1972)
(Amish); W. DOUGLAS, THE BIBLE AND THE SCHOOLS 39-46 (1966) (Moslems).
326. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 23 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
327. See supra note 176.
328. 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3067 (1983), quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, dissenting
in part). But see Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3440-41 (1985) (Powell, J., conPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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The Lynch v. Donnelly majority has concluded: "We are unable to perceive
the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Vicar of Rome, or other powerful religious
leader behind every public acknowledgment of the religious heritage long officially recognized by the three constitutional branches of government." 29
The danger of a preoccupation with one factor, such as the dangers inherent in church-state relations, is that other factors receive disproportionately
less attention. The time is ripe for the Court to give greater consideration to
religion's secular contribution. The basic principles of neutrality and separation should remain in place. At least in the close cases, however, increased
attention to religion's positive contribution would permit an important consideration to enjoy appropriate attention.

curring) (expressing concern that a school aid program could cause political
divisiveness).
329. 463 U.S. 388, 400 (1984).
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